Some Reflections about Unity of Law and of Normative Systems
This paper aims to analyse the philosophical premises on which the idea of unity of law (identity of legal system) is based. In the history of legal philosophy this idea found its main arguments in the presumption of totality of legal regulation. Such totality translated the philosophical tenets of holism according to which law is not limited to the positive-law rules and institutes. To substantiate the idea of systemacity of law, one can turn to the modern debates about logic of social cohesion and construct a legal system identity as a purely intellectual hypothesis necessary for thinking about law. This integrity can be described as a unity of discourse, or as a unity of societal practices. This reconstruction of integrity of law can be extended by appealing to the basic ideas of normative philosophy of law (from Hart and Kelsen to Raz and Dworkin) and is reconcilable with the conception of normative systems of Bulygin–Alchourron.