Book chapter
Сложность порядковых правил коллективного выбора
Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set, two versions of the minimal weakly stable sets, the uncaptured set, the untrapped set, the minimal undominated set (strong top cycle) and the minimal dominant set (weak top cycle). The main results presented are the following. 1) A criterion to determine whether an alternative belongs to a minimal weakly stable set is found. It establishes the logical connection between minimal weakly stable sets and covering relation. 2) In tournaments and in general case it is determined for all twelve sets, whether each two of them are related by inclusion or not. 3) In tournaments the concept of stability is employed to generalize the notions of weakly stable and uncovered sets. New concepts of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets are introduced and their properties and mutual relations are explored. 4) A concept of the minimal dominant set is generalized. It helps to establish that in general case all dominant sets are ordered by strict inclusion. In tournaments the hierarchies of the classes of k-stable alternatives and k-stable sets combined with the system of dominant sets constitute tournament’s structure (“microstructure” and “macrostructure” respectively). This internal structure may be treated as a system of reference, which is based on difference in degrees of stability. An algorithm for calculating the minimal dominant sets and the classes of k-stable alternatives is also given.
Procedures aggregating individual preferences into a collective choice differ in their vulnerability to manipulations. To measure it, one may consider the share of preference profiles where manipulation is possible in the total number of profiles, which is called Nitzan-Kelly's index of manipulability. The problem of manipulability can be considered in different probability models. There are three models based on anonymity and neutrality: impartial culture model (IC), impartial anonymous culture model (IAC), and impartial anonymous and neutral culture model (IANC). In contrast to the first two models, the IANC model, which is based on anonymity and neutrality axioms, has not been widely studied. In addition, there were no attempts to derive the difference of probabilities (such as Nitzan-Kelly's index) in IC and IANC analytically. We solve this problem and show in which cases the upper bound of this difference is high enough, and in which cases it is almost zero. These results enable us to simplify the computation of indices.
When a society needs to take a collective decision one could apply some aggregation method, particularly, voting. One of the main problems with voting is manipulation. We say a voting rule is vulnerable to manipulation if there exists at least one voter who can achieve a better voting result by misrepresenting his or her preferences. The popular approach to comparing manipulability of voting rules is defining complexity class of the corresponding manipulation problem. This paper provides a survey into manipulation complexity literature considering variety of problems with different assumptions and restrictions.