Доверие и готовность объединяться как факторы самоорганизации
The civil society sector—made up of millions of nonprofit organizations, associations, charitable institutions, and the volunteers and resources they mobilize—has long been the invisible subcontinent on the landscape of contemporary society. For the past twenty years, however, scholars under the umbrella of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project have worked with statisticians to assemble the first comprehensive, empirical picture of the size, structure, financing, and role of this increasingly important part of modern life.
What accounts for the enormous cross-national variations in the size and contours of the civil society sector around the world? Drawing on the project’s data, Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Megan A. Haddock, and their colleagues raise serious questions about the ability of the field’s currently dominant preference and sentiment theories to account for these variations in civil society development. Instead, using statistical and comparative historical materials, the authors posit a novel social origins theory that roots the variations in civil society strength and composition in the relative power of different social groupings and institutions during the transition to modernity.
Drawing on the work of Barrington Moore, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and others, Explaining Civil Society Development provides insight into the nonprofit sector’s ability to thrive and perform its distinctive roles. Combining solid data and analytical clarity, this pioneering volume offers a critically needed lens for viewing the evolution of civil society and the nonprofit sector throughout the world.
The article is devoted to the problem of mutual correlation between individual and political freedom in the context of ethical, legal and political legitimation of the state. The method - hermeneutical reconstruction and comparative analysis of the state philosophy by Kant, Hegel and Husserl. As a result of hermeneutic reconstruction of Kant’s state philosophy, there are revealed four constitutional factors: the principle of freedom, republicanism, the principle of membership and legality. Kant makes a distinction between noumenal (moral) and phenomenal (political-legal) freedom, emphasizing that in the sphere of politics and law, nominal freedom cannot become the basis of moral law, since it should not be limited from the outside (heteronomically), but only be relied upon by the individual “from within” (autonomously). For Kant, noumenal freedom is the only right initially given to each person on the basis of his belonging to the human race (natural low). The political community, represented by the state, is authorized only to protect this freedom from external coercion, but has no right to encroach on the restriction of internal (nominal) human freedom. Kant chooses the Republic as preferred form of government, since the law is the final authority. As a result of the comparative analysis of Kant’s and Hegel's state philosophy, the author comes to the conclusion that both thinkers are unanimous in understanding freedom as a basis for state legitimization. At the same time, Hegel “removes” Kant's established distinction between nominal and phenomenal freedom and takes as a basis the collective, universal freedom of the state, which embodies objectivity, truth and morality. The highest ideal and duty of the individual is to renounce autonomy in the name of the state, which is defined as a divine end in itself. Hegel picks up the ethical strategy of Kant's interpretation of the state and complementing it with two others: the understanding of the state as a result of natural teleology (the purpose of nature) and as a result of reasonable teleology (conscious and free choice of human). Hegel prefers monarchy as preferred form of government. Husserl, following Kant, develops and consistently radicalizes ethical and instrumentalist understanding of the state, emphasizing its transitory nature and focusing on the self-realization of a free, phenomenologically reflective individual. However, the freedom of the individual phenomenologist is limited by attachment to the phenomenological and contains rudiments of natural and intelligent teleology in the spirit of Hegel. Although phenomenology, in Husserl's understanding, is neither a “state philosophy” nor a purely personal practice, it acquires the specific nature of the intellectual aristocracy: the phenomenological movement and the community of phenomenologists represent the ideal completion of the political history of European humanity.
The article presents the findings of a study on civil society and the intersectoral partnership in Omsk region. The situation in the institutions of civil society, interaction of the government, businesses and non-governmental organizations are analyzed. The article specifies the factors that influence the situation in the civil society of Omsk region. The causes of the underdeveloped intersectoral partnership in Omsk region based on the findings of the expert survey conducted in the spring of 2018 are revealed.
This chapter looks at the role of the globalised third sector in migration governance, and presents major theoretical and empirical contributions focusing on different aspects of the third sector’s, often ambiguous, role in migration politics and policy. It starts with a discussion on the third sector’s growing involvement in the migration field, then proceeds with an analysis of the third sector as new governors aspiring to shape migration regimes regionally and globally. The chapter uncovers complex patterns of interactions between the third sector and other actors in global migration governance, paying attention to aspects such as financial dependence of the third sector on donors, subordinated politics and competition for funding and prestige. The picture that emerges from this chapter indicates that the third sector is far from being and acting as a unified actor in migration governance.