Монолог... или диалог? (Закономерности развития и формирования побуждений детей в семье)
The idea of ligalization of bribe giving for certain types of bribes was expressed by K. Basu in 2011 and got a name Basu proposal. In this paper we discuss effects that can be caused by the direct implementation of this proposal. Our game-theoretic model shows that while legalisation of certain bribe-giving occurances can lead to some positive consequences, it is not always a good idea to return bribe to the bribe-giver as suggested by Basu. The chance to get the paid bribe back increases the amount of bribes that end up in corrupt officials' pockets.
The distractive effects on attentional task performance in different paradigms are analyzed in this paper. I demonstrate how distractors may negatively affect (interference effect), positively (redundancy effect) or neutrally (null effect). Distractor effects described in literature are classified in accordance with their hypothetical source. The general rule of the theory is also introduced. It contains the formal prediction of the particular distractor effect, based on entropy and redundancy measures from the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 1948). Single- vs dual-process frameworks are considered for hypothetical mechanisms which underpin the distractor effects. Distractor profiles (DPs) are also introduced for the formalization and simple visualization of experimental data concerning the distractor effects. Typical shapes of DPs and their interpretations are discussed with examples from three frequently cited experiments. Finally, the paper introduces hierarchical hypothesis that states the level-fashion modulating interrelations between distractor effects of different classes.