Book
Переходная экономика: теоретические аспекты, российские проблемы, мировой опыт
М.: Экономика, 2004.
Chapters
Бессонов В. А., Дробышевский С. М., Энтов Р. М. В кн.: Переходная экономика: теоретические аспекты, российские проблемы, мировой опыт. М.: Экономика, 2004. Гл. 6. С. 193-256.
Added: Jan 27, 2013
Similar publications
Галанов В. А., Галанова А. В. Вестник Российского экономического университета им. Г.В. Плеханова. 2011. № 1. С. 34-42.
Added: Jul 24, 2012
Верников А. В. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. University Library of Munich, 2009. № 17897.
Added: Sep 3, 2012
Added: Aug 9, 2012
Puzanov A. In bk.: Social Housing in Transition Countries. NY; Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2013. Ch. 14. P. 225-234.
This article sets out to describe the current situation in the social housing sector in Russia. The author presents the historical background of social housing in Russia, it’s development and current conditions in the context of the transition from planned housing sector to one governed by market relations. The article also contains the analysis of the key structural elements of the social housing sector and expert evaluation of how well the social housing works as a mechanism for improving the housing conditions of the poor and vulnerable groups of population. The important role in the article is given to the legal status of social housing tenants, rent-setting policies and the problems of social housing finance. The main development opportunities and the main challenges for housing policy are revealed in the final sections of the article.
Added: May 20, 2013
Edited by: Л. Совершаева СПб.: Институт "Северо-Запад", 2009.
Added: Oct 6, 2013
Added: Aug 21, 2012
Горбунова Е. В., Карабчук Т. С., Сухова А. С. и др. В кн.: Вестник Российского мониторинга экономического положения и здоровья населения НИУ ВШЭ (RLMS-HSE). Вып. 2. М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2012.
Added: Mar 27, 2014
Филимонов Д. В., Смирнов А. В кн.: Публичная политика – 2010. СПб.: НОРМА, 2011. С. 117-125.
Added: Aug 22, 2013
Капелюшников Р. И. «Проблемы рынка труда». WP3. ГУ ВШЭ, 2006. № WP3/2006/03.
The paper examines relationship between human capital and the labor market outcomes in Russia. Main findings are that high educational attainment considerably strengthen workers’ competitive positions. More educated groups have much higher labor force participation rates, employment rates and earnings but lower unemployment rates. In Russia «premium» in earnings of college graduates over earnings of high school graduates approaches to 60—70 percent e.g. is of same order as in mature market economies. This implies that «good» formal education is valued in the Russian labor marker no less that in the labor markets of most other countries. However decreasing returns to skills for younger cohorts of Russian workers suggest that competitive advantages provided by high educational attainment might not be sustainable.
Added: Oct 29, 2012
СПб.: ГУАП, 2010.
Added: Feb 17, 2013
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Added: Jun 24, 2011