Book
Индекс экономического настроения (Индекс ВШЭ) в IV квартале 2011 г.
М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2012.
Leading author:
Г. В. Остапкович
Research target:
Economics and Management
Priority areas:
economics
Language:
Russian
Full text (PDF, 1.13 Mb)
Keywords:
Индекс экономического настроения (Индекс ВШЭ)деловой климатиндекс предпринимательской уверенностииндекс потребительской уверенностифакторы, отрицательно влияющие на деятельность организаций реального сектора экономики
Publication based on the results of:
Monitoring of Business Climate in Real Sector and Service Organizations(2011)
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