Фирмы, рынок и право
М.: Новое издательство, 2007.
Болдырев И. А. Экономическая социология. 2011. Т. 12. № 1. С. 25-42.
Added: Aug 30, 2012
Makarov A. S. In bk.: History of Accounting, Business Administration Doctrines and Development of New Methods of Management in Italy and in Russia. 1-2 October 2007, Florence. Nizhny Novgorod: 2008. P. 65-79.
The legal, methodological base and example of the modern bakruptcy analysis of a Russian company is considered under its development from the 1992 to 2007.
Added: Jul 18, 2012
Правовое регулирование предпринимательской деятельности./ Учебное пособие. 3-е издание, исправленное и дополненное
Беляков В. Г. СПб.: Высшая школа менеджмента СПбГУ, 2008.
Added: Dec 3, 2012
Предметная характеристика медицинской деятельности как основа ее уголовно-правовой охраны (опыт России, США, Франции)
Нагорная И. И. Право и политика. 2012. № 5. С. 887-896.
Added: Aug 3, 2012
In this paper we draw upon important distinctions suggested by classics of anthropology in order to develop a theoretical approach to the phenomenon of debt. Building on the opposition be-tween the logic of the gift and that of the market, we elucidate moral tensions that call debt rela-tions into being. However, instead of reducing debt to either of these rival principles, we inter-pret it as a combination of both that allows for mediating between them in a highly ambiguous moral context. Using evidence from a small Russian town, we analyse how interest-free debt functions within face-to-face interactions in local shops and how it structures the ordinary lives of shopkeepers, salespeople and consumers in the community. We discuss a moral situation that turns the fram-ing of everyday purchases into a problem and demonstrate how a material device — a debt book — enters into a transaction in order to resolve it. A debt book turns out to be a specific graphic technology, a destructive device that subverts both marketization and communitarian aid by sus-pending the framing of interaction. In the resulting atmosphere of ambiguity, debts become an object of strategic manipulation for the members of community that demands good negotiation skills and use of moral arguments. Although the constitution of debt economy is highly dependent on the dynamics of marketization and economization, it can in fact accommodate very different moral regimes.
Added: Aug 25, 2014
Лошкарева М. Е. В кн.: Кодификация законодательства: теория, практика, техника: Материалы Международной научно-практической конференции (Нижний Новгород, 25–26 сентября 2008 года). Н. Новгород: Нижегородская академия МВД России, 2009. С. 565-577.
Added: May 24, 2012
Added: Sep 13, 2012
Уголовно-правовая охрана прав и интересов собственников многоквартирных домов с позиции применения ст. 327 УК РФ
Залпов Н. В. Право и политика. 2012. № 6. С. 1086-1092.
Added: Jul 27, 2012
Романов П. В., Ярская-Смирнова Е. Р. В кн.: Антропология профессий: границы занятости в эпоху нестабильности. М.: Вариант, 2012. С. 7-28.
Added: May 28, 2012
Added: Sep 13, 2012
Экономика и управление: проблемы и перспективы развития. Сборник научных статей по итогам международной научно-практической конференции г.Волгоград 15-16 ноября 2010 г.
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Added: Feb 22, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4. С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Уринсон Я. М. Вестник Европы. 2014. № 38-39.
Added: Feb 5, 2018
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Added: Jun 24, 2011