Социально-экономические аспекты «раскулачивания» крестьян Южного Урала (1930-1934 гг.)
This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus’ behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi-democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.
The paper analyzes how the agricultural sector applies outsourcing in its practice. What differs the outsourcing from other forms of cooperation of enterprises is identified. We show that an agro-enterprise could function as an outsourcee. Some ways of how outsourcing can be used in the agricultural production to make its profitability higher are proposed here.