Голландский эпизод в философской биографии С.Л. Франка (новые материалы)
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
The Book of the Concordance of Faith (Kitāb iǧtimāʿ al-amāna) is an ecumenical treatise that aims at reconciling three main denominations of Syrian Christianity: the ‘Nestorians’, the ‘Melkites’, and the ‘Jacobites’. The work is known in two recensions, one of which is ascribed to Elias al-Ǧawharī, while the other, probably the original one, is attributed to ʿAlī ibn Dāwūd al-Arfādī. Russian historians frequently referenced to the treatise as written by “Elias Geveri, the Nestorian Metropolitan,” emphasizing that the work contains a testimony to the two-ﬁnger sign of the cross current in his time among the Melkites. The article deals with the source on which these references are based to explore the ecumenical views in the medieval Christian Orient, with a special reference to the ‘roots and branches’ concept.
In Part 3 of his Ethics, Baruch Spinoza identifies the conatus of the mind as "will" and of the mind and body together as "appetite" / "desire," but he does not identify the conatus of the body. This omission is curious, given that he describes "motion-and-rest" and conatus in such ways that they appear to be one and the same thing. In this paper, however, I propose that motion-and-rest and conatus (in the attribute of extension) can be understood as two distinct aspects, relational and singular, of Spinoza's theory of the individuation of bodies. In Section 1, I explain Spinoza's account of the body. In Section 2, I reject the notion that the conatus of the body is a principle of rectilinear inertia. In Section 3, I indicate that besides the conatus, Spinoza uses other terms throughout his texts to denote the concept of striving, each of which alludes to a relational and singular aspect of his theory of individuation. In Section 4, I show that for Spinoza, motion-and-rest refers to the relational ("preindividual") aspect of the body and that conatus (in the attribute of extension) refers to the singular (individuated) aspect of the body.
At the very core of Frank's perception of culture here is the primary 1-You relation. On the one hand, it separates the culture from the world of distinct things in which there are the subject-object connections; on the other hand, it transfers the researcher's position inside the space of culture. An art is the most pure manifestation of culture, which turns to be the model of pure existence, not divided into different subjects and therefore perceived by intuition. The culture for Frank is not an object to be contemplated but the very type of relationship of man and reality.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.