Book
МИКРОЭКОНОМИКА
Ракута Н. В., Бондаренко Н. Е., Громыко В. В., Дубовик М. В., Казаринова Е. Б., Савинова М. В.
Under the general editorship:
В. В. Громыко
Research target:
Economics and Management (including Public Administration)
Priority areas:
economics
Language:
Russian
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