ICTIC - Proceedings in Conference of Informatics and Management Sciences. The 5th International Virtual Conference
This article presents a model of business organization in highly corrupted economy. In real life we always meet “big” firms who win the tender, and hire “little specialized firm” to realize the contract. Our model provides an explanation for puzzling fact why firms which win the government contract in auctions, need to hire someone else to realize the project. In our article Iwill try to show that a firm can use mixed strategy and the amount of bribe will decrease.
The social employment mechanisms in Russian firms are considered. The social selection factors in the employment process in Russian firms are analyzed. The author investigates the social organization characteristics of Russian firms.
Cooperative game theory instruments application to the corporate finance M&A research issues provide an ability to extend the field considered and conclusions obtained. The paper presents the M&A cooperative games modeling and its empirical implementation to analyze the airline strategic alliance as M&A deal.
Public-private partnerships (PPP) are often seen as a form of interaction between the state and the business sector. This provides useful insights in the special features of such an interaction but does not provide a yet widely sought efficiency perspective. We consider PPP as a form of business organization and show that PPP has advantages as compared to other forms of business organization in the provision of public goods. This approach yields natural criteria under which the provision of public goods is optimal through a PPP. The main theoretical conclusions are supported by practical examples.
The authors investigate behavioural assumptions underlying the normal performance of market economy. It is assumed that a model of man adequate for market economy can be deduced from the ideal-typical properties of the latter. The main components of such model are rationality and morality. Main ethical categories relevant for market economy are analyzed: trust, justice, equality, virtues, freedom as well as their treatment in modern economics. Behavioural properties specifi c for modern Russian economy are discussed.
In this paper, we want to introduce experimental economics to the field of data mining and vice versa. It continues related work on mining deterministic behavior rules of human subjects in data gathered from experiments. Game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work with this data. Equilibria also known as game-theoretic predictions solely succeed with experienced subjects in specific games – conditions, which are rarely given. Contemporary experimental economics offers a number of alternative models apart from game theory. In relevant literature, these models are always biased by philosophical plausibility considerations and are claimed to fit the data. An agnostic data mining approach to the problem is introduced in this paper – the philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the correlations are found. No other biases are regarded apart from determinism. The dataset of the paper “Social Learning in Networks” by Choi et al 2012 is taken for evaluation. As a result, we come up with new findings. As future work, the design of a new infrastructure is discussed.
The collection contains papers accepted for the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 28–30, 2010, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.
While building various approaches to the bank distributing network control, one should regard a bank as a system. A bank with a network is a kind of organizational systems, which have a complicated nature. Hence, a systematic approach and a set of diverse system concepts should be applied while they are scrutinized
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.