Современная когнитология и когнитивная аналитика в контексте философской инноватики: монография
Proceedings of the conference "Cognitive Science in Moscow: New Research" (June 19, 2019).
In recent years there has been a growing interest in cognition within sociology and other social sciences. Within sociology this interest cuts across various topical subfields, including culture, social psychology, religion, race, and identity. Scholars within the new subfield of cognitive sociology, also referred to as the sociology of culture and cognition, are contributing to a rapidly developing body of work on how mental and social phenomena are interrelated and often interdependent. In The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Sociology, Wayne H. Brekhus and Gabe Igantow have gathered some of the most influential scholars working in cognitive sociology to present an accessible introduction to key research areas in a diverse field. While classical sociological and newer interdisciplinary approaches have been covered separately by scholars in the past, this volume alternatively presents a broad range of cognitive sociological perspectives. The contributors discuss a range of approaches for theorizing and analyzing the "social mind," including macro-cultural approaches, interactionist approaches, and research that draws on Pierre Bourdieu's major concepts. Each chapter further investigates a variety of cognitive processes within these three approaches, such as attention and inattention, perception, automatic and deliberate cognition, cognition and social action, stereotypes, categorization, classification, judgment, symbolic boundaries, meaning-making, metaphor, embodied cognition, morality and religion, identity construction, time sequencing, and memory. A comprehensive look at cognitive sociology's main contributions and the central debates within the field, the Handbook will serve as a primary resource for social researchers, faculty, and students interested in how cognitive sociology can contribute to research within their substantive areas of focus.
The article is devoted to the role and place of neuroethics in national and international projects for the study of the human brain. The work deals exclusively with those projects that have chosen the using of complex systemic multifactor models of the brain and nervous system as the main method of research, the coordinated work of which is provided by the large computing resources of hardware and software systems and is implemented in a series of computer simulations of the neurophysiological, neurobiological and neuropsychological processes of a living organism, including human. Such projects declare the widest range of solutions to the problems associated with the study of the brain: from studies the characteristics of the transmission of electrical signals between the synapses of neurons to research in the field of the emergence, functioning and development of such higher functions of the brain as intelligence and consciousness.
The final part of the article is devoted to the correctness of the neurophilosophical concept of the origin and functioning of consciousness and intelligence on the principles of a neuromorphic nature, namely, the possibility of interpreting the phenomenon of the emergence of consciousness as the highest form of nervous activity and its further development, based on natural science laws embedded in the biological structure of the brain and nervous system. Which means, in the case of understanding and further creation of technologies for reproducing such laws, the real possibility of obtaining artificial intelligence and consciousness without reference to living organisms, in particular to humans. The author questions this view of the nature of consciousness in the course of a thought experiment, which is based on arguments from the subject area of computer simulations, and also assumes the brain as a complex computer system, similar to existing supercomputers, but from the point of view of architecture and software arranged and functioning according to more complex algorithms.
The paper briefly introduces the history of cognitive psychology from its emergence in the 1950s until the present. The unique contribution of cognitive psychology to psychological science is discussed. The main lines of cognitive psychology criticism and self-criticism are outlined: they include the single representational format in the information processing system, the limited resources of this system, and the degree of similarity in information processing between living and artificial systems. A number of state of the art research areas have emerged as a response to these criticisms: among them are embodied cognition, situated cognition, social and distributed cognition, emotional cognition, and many others. Possible scenarios of the further development of cognitive psychology and cognitive science are analyzed.
The paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of Alexander Piatigorsky’s observational philosophy within the context of the confrontation between two versions of the transcendental project of man-in-the-world. The first project accentuates the invariant functional organization of cognitive systems by abstracting from bodily, affective and phenomenological realization of this realization. On the contrary, the second project emphasizes the phenomenological perspective of the experience of givenness, always already dependent on who’s this experience is and how the cognitive system living this experience is organized. The first project can be called functionalist, and the second – phenomenological. Ontological and epistemological positions of these projects are specified in the problem of the observer, its status in the world and cognitive practice. The observational philosophy possesses an intermediate position between these two programs, for, aiming to disclose the invariant structure of observation, proceeds from the factual experience of the embodied subject placed into the situation of self-observation and observation of the other subject. It is shown that Piatigorsky’s philosophy borrows from the functionalist project the commitment to self-objectivation (observation of thinking is always the observation of the other thinking) and rejection from the spatiotemporal localization of cognitive activity (thinking is always ‘none’s’ and does not belong to any kind of individual). With the phenomenological project of enactivism Piatogorsky shares the aspiration to disclose the invariant cognitive structures during the empirical observation of the real enactment of cognitive agency (the organization of cognitive systems is the same while its structural realizations are multiple), abandonment of substantialization of the self (‘none’s’ thinking is considered as the emergent effect of interaction among two or several observers – the autopoietic systems), as well as the refusal from theoretical formulation of the problem of consciousness (observational philosophy develops metatheoretical prolegomena to theory of consciousness, which in turn is considered as lived and essentially practical in phenomenology).
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.