Андрей Белый. Штейнер и Гете в мировоззрении современности. Воспоминания о Штейнере. Собрание сочинений. Комментарии, послесловие И.Н.Лагутиной
Drawing upon exegetical and scientific writings of Isaac Newton, his followers (W. Whiston) and opponents (Ch. Burnet), present study deals with the rise of objectivism – fundamental epistemic principle underlying the modern scientific worldview. The study is focused upon the synthesis of three epistemological principles, which shaped the science of Enlightenment: hermeneutic transparency of text in exegesis, mathematical certainty in natural science, and realistic mimesis in literary criticism. The author also examines the epistemological project, opposed to objectivistic paradigm, that puts together allegory in biblical scholarship, hypothetical method in physic and the primacy of literariness over referentiality in literary theory. Present article seeks to contribute to the genealogy of objective reality – ontological a priori of the modern scientific thought, emerged from the confusion of methodologies and discourses, characteristic to early Modern Times.
On the one hand, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is admittedly the integrative part of the history of phenomenological movement. On the other hand, the hermeneutical subject area, as well as disciplinary self-awareness of hermeneutics, diverges considerably from that of the initial E. Husserl's phenomenological project. This fact serves as a motif for reconstruction of the intrinsic logic of the phenomenological movement. The aim of such reconstruction is to answer the following questions: What is the reason for including philosophical hermeneutics into phenomenological philosophy? What role does hermeneutics play in the history of the phenomenological movement? The interpretation of phenomenological subject area in terms of primordial phenomenality serves as a horizon for this reconstruction of the essential logic of phenomenological research. Such understanding of phenomenological philosophy focus has priority over conventional characteristics of phenomenological subject matter as a variety of phenomena accessible within special methodological attitude. It allows, first of all, to avoid fragmentation of the area of primordial, i.e. phenomenological phenomena and to minimize presuppositions. The totality of phenomenality blocks constructivism inherent to descriptive phenomenology and in consequence limits the application field of reflexive or methodological approaches. The process of disclosing or articulating primordial phenomenality can be described as phenomenologising. Eventually, phenomenology as an explicative method is regarded as the first part of the two-level process of phenomenologising. The second part of this process is the spontaneous self-disclosing of primordial phenomenality. The idea of two-level phenomenology (phenomenology as a method and as a spontaneous event) has been differently realised in Heidegger's and Gadamer's phenomenological-hermeneutical conceptions. From the very beginning Heidegger stands up for the performative, i.e. existential-practical understanding of phenomenological explication. According to him, phenomenology does not so much explicate phenomena but points at those areas and forms of experience where that explication occurs spontaneously. Still, Heidegger is oriented at the explication of static structures of these experiences (which he calls existentialities), which allows us to speak about rudimentary transcendentalism of his philosophical position. In his late works Heidegger emphasises the world-disclosing potency of ontic experiences. Gadamer develops this tendency considering various everyday experiences such as perception of art, participation in rituals, reading, and etc. to be areas of spontaneous phenomenologising.