The article considers China’s development of its soft power policy. The analysis focuses on seven major directions of that policy: the popularization of the Chinese language, the promotion of Chinese classical and modern culture, the expansion of education contacts; the development of economic ties, the provision of foreign aid, the promotion of public diplomacy and compatriots policy.
The author explores the main problems and successful results of China’s use of soft power, and the major mechanisms and tools of its implementation.
The analysis found that Confucius Institutes and classes are the most important tool for popularizing the Chinese language. Chinese cultural centres and various cultural meetings promote China’s traditional culture effectively. China actively develops education links with other countries; it attracts increasing numbers of international students, with more than 360,000 going to China in 2013. The most effective illustration of China’s soft power success is the country’s spread and development of international economic partnerships, achieved through instruments and techniques such as exhibitions, external investment and swap agreements. China also provides much aid to developing countries, preferring bilateral channels over multilateral mechanisms. Unique aspects of China’s soft power include “panda diplomacy” and disaster diplomacy. China frequently promotes its soft power through its diaspora (huaqiao), and has structured those contacts and links using a legal base and powerful governmental mechanisms.
Nevertheless, China’s soft power policy remains rather weak. This is due to two reasons. The first is the lack of generally accepted and recognized moral narratives in its soft power policy. The second is the problem of the “target audience” of China’s soft power, which are the governments of foreign countries rather than their societies.Citation: Mikhnevich S. (2014) Panda na sluzhbe Drakona: osnovnye napravleniya i mekhanizmy politiki «myagkoy sily» Kitaya [The Panda in the Dragon’s Service: The Main Directions and Mechanisms of China’s Soft Power Policy]. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH JOURNAL, vol. 9, no 2 (in Russian)
The UN Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted in 2015 serve as a universal guide for developed and developing countries in their national policies and international cooperation aimed at combating global challenges. The SDGs build on the outcomes of the global partnership for development cooperation collective efforts, the foundations of which were laid in the 20th century. The article explores the international development cooperation system as it evolved in the UN from 1946 till United Nations Millennium Declaration adoption in 2000. The study draws on the analysis of the resolutions and official records of the UN main bodies, foremost, the General assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Content analysis of the records reveals the delegations’ positions, interests, contradictions and tensions, concealed by the smooth resolutions’ texts. The four development decades culminated in adoption of the Millennium Declaration. Each stage had its achievements and problems. The main principles, mechanisms and areas of cooperation were molded in the GA and ECOSOC early sessions. The creation of development support instruments began in mid1940th, when the World Health Organization, the UNICEF, the FAO, the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and later the UN Special Fund were established. The dollar monopoly was entrenched. The international trade expansion and removal of barriers to trade issues gained prominence in the UN resolutions in the 1950th. In 1960 the goal of increasing the flows of assistance and capital to developing countries to 1 per cent of the combined national incomes of economically developed countries was set for the first time. The 1961-1970 period was marked by adoption of the programme for international development cooperation – the first UN Development Decade and the World food programme, establishment of the UNIDO and UNCTAD, elaboration of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. The need for the international monetary reform was debated in conjunction with the UN pursuit of a solution to the problems of rising debt and ensuring international liquidity. The second decade key milestones include gradual integration of development and environment issues; efforts for resolution of international monetary crisis and alleviation of rising debt burden; increase of pledging targets for the UNDP, WFP, and special funds; the decision on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; efforts to promote implementation of the differential treatment principle with regard to developing countries within the GATT; adoption of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade; and a failed attempt to launch “global negotiations on restructuring of international economic relations on the basis of the principles of justice and equality in order to provide for steady economic development”. In the third decade progress was made towards strengthening science and technology, industrial and resource development capacity of the developing countries. The UN endorsed the Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000, adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development and the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade. The transition to the sustainable development model was a major achievement. The economic recession, high rates of interest, inflation and mounting deficits, the problems of liquidity and balance of payments, protectionism, structural imbalances in the world economy required a comprehensive decision on the reform of the international monetary system, however, the global negotiations were deadlocked due to G7 position that the independence of the specialized agencies (IMF, WB and the WTO) should be guaranteed. Despite the Group of 77 efforts to deal comprehensively with the full range of economic issues, the G7 insistence on their Versailles 1982 summit formula blocked the global negotiations, defined the IMS rigidity for many years to come and its failure to prevent the 1998 and 2008 crises. The Agenda for Development adopted in June 1997 and the UN Millennium Declaration adopted in September 2000 became the landmarks of the fourth decade and the development cooperation history. The international community made a long way in building and consolidating development cooperation in the second half of the 20th century. The UN became a cradle and a driver of this process, and a factor of its success. Indisputable achievements of the 55 years’ collective efforts include a consistent consolidation of its programme documents foundation from the first development decade to Millennium development goals; continuous improvement of the reviewing and appraisal process; integration of the environmental issues into development agenda; establishment of key development cooperation institutions and significant increase in financing for development. However, efforts to create the conditions for sustained progress and development restructuring international economic system with due account of the developing countries’ interests failed. The 21st century inherited systemic problems of the international monetary and trade systems.
The institutional aspect of post-crisis banking regulation reform (Basel III) remains unsettled, and as such undermines regulators’ efforts to shape a seamless platform for international financial intermediation. The lack of global acceptance of the Basel III standards amid the internationalization of banking activities is one of the main reasons for regulatory asymmetries which are difficult to handle at the national level. In this context, the efforts of governments and financial regulators are a central core of their policy in protecting banking sectors from systemic risks. It becomes imperative to bring together national mechanisms of banking regulation and to develop a regional system of regulatory institutions, as is evidenced by the single supervisory mechanism in the eurozone countries.
Strengthening stress-resilience of the national banking sectors in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the expansion of banking activities to the Eurasian economy will require a conceptual framework of the EAEU banking regulation system. However, different regulatory regimes in EAEU states along with the lack of supranational regulatory institutions may slow the progress of the Eurasian mechanism of banking regulation. This means that operationalization of the EAEU regulatory mechanism will depend on whether the mini-Basel III format as a methodological hub of regionalization and supranationalization will act as an enabler of a resolution to the regulatory trilemma of the feasibility, relevance and opportunities of supranationalization.
The institutional aspect of mini-Basel III is intrinsically linked to the integrity and consistency of the supranational authority for regulation of EAEU financial markets being an authority documented in the treaty on the EAEU; however, the costs of regulatory alignment may exceed the advantages of a single-institution regulatory architecture owing to the existent and tacit risks from the heterogeneity of the national regulatory models. Stemming from the complex financial sector environment that falls short of valid and reliable institutional fundamentals, this article proposes alternative scenarios for the EAEU regulatory mechanism that could be sought for optimization of regulatory logistics and algorithms of regulatory alignment. Based on systematization of the benefits and weaknesses of each of the scenarios as well as on a comparative analysis as to whether the proposed scenarios would ensure a continuum of financial intermediation and financial stability, this article concludes that currently there are no priority approaches to the design of a supranational institutional system in the EAEU. At the same time, the identical structure of national banking sectors together with the least expensive scenario approach could underpin the process of regulatory supranationalization; however, to secure the integrity of the EAEU supranational authority, it should be complemented with an authority that would be responsible for the coordination of EAEU-wide regulatory alignment.
The article presents the main outcomes of a comprehensive research on the North-Eastern Federal University role in development of Far Eastern Federal District. The article includes outcomes of the field and desk studies: analysis of statistical data on socio-economic development of the Far Eastern District, self-assessment of North Eastern Federal University departments, surveys on the basis of formalized experts’ interviews and focus groups of various stakeholders. The research revealed the university tangible impact on the city (Yakutsk) and the Republic of Sakha development. However, the university needs a strategy to promote its influence in other Far Eastern regions and strengthen its positions in the Republic of Sakha. The analysis demonstrates that the university possesses necessary capacities to strengthen its positions to generate influence on territorial development in Far Eastern Federal District. However, utilization of the potential would require an agreement on a strategy to go ahead and harnessing of resources. The research is conducted in the framework of the project “Analysis of the NEFU’s role in the development of the territory on the basis of the OECD methodology adapted for Russian universities to develop recommendations for enhancement university’s influence on innovative, technological, educational and socio-cultural development of the region”, implemented within the contract № 1537-09/12, 24.09.2012 by the Institute of International Organisations of the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” and Department for Strategic Development of North Eastern Federal University in 2012.
The paper explores the outcomes of Russian Federation G20 Presidency in 2013. The analysis is based on the model of balancing external conditions and national priorities for developing an agenda in informal institutions (supply-demand model). This analytical paradigm allows to reveal to what extent the Presidency has managed to ensure: 1) a high level of response to the key global governance challenges in the agenda and summit decisions; 2) a balance between national and other members’ interests in the Presidency priorities; 3) utilizing the institution’s capabilities; 4) conformity of the role chosen by the Presidency (organizer, mediator, political leader, national representative) to the combination of external and internal conditions.
Russia took over the responsibility for coordinating the G20 work from Mexico, accepting the rotating presidency of this premier forum for economic cooperation on December 1, 2012. The G20 met the fifth year of its work under conditions of a two speed recovery which by March 2013 transformed into a three speed recovery. Unsteady and sluggish growth, persisting imbalances and downside global economy risks demanded that this forum of the world largest economies concentrate the efforts on developing a set of measures aimed at boosting sustainable, inclusive and balanced growth and jobs creation around the world. These priorities constituted the core of the Russian G20 presidency concept, aimed at ensuring sustainable global growth and rebuilding of trust between the world economy different agents in accordance with the G20 mission and capability.
Consolidating efforts on its core economic and financial priorities, the G20 also launched collaboration to overcome such risks as increasing income disparities, chronic underinvestment into development of safe, secure and modern infrastructure, unforeseen consequences of regulation.
The analysis findings reveal that the Russian presidency managed to ensure a good balance of national interests and the partners’ prioritiesin the G20 agenda; utilizing the G20 capabilities to respond to the key global governance challenges. The choice of the presidency role depended on the nature of the issues and was defined by a combination of internal and external conditions. Thus, the acuteness of the problem for all summit participants determined demand for leadership in including into the economic forum agenda the debate on a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Syria. On employment and social policies the Russian presidency combining the roles of an organizer and a political leader helped upgrade the G20 dialogue to a new quality level.
A major success factor in deliberation and adoption of the comprehensive action plan on base erosion and profit shifting was the OECD capability to take responsibility for the plan development. With the OECD leadership, solid experts’ foundation, and a high level of relevance of the problem for all members, the presidency supported the process as the organizer.
On the topic of stimulating long-term investment, a priority for Russia as well as most of the G20 partners, the presidency managed to consolidate the efforts of several international institutions over a short period. On this priority, as well as on the financial regulation reform, the presidency acted as a representative of the national interests and an organizer. In developing the new development strategy the choice in favor of a combination of a mediator and an organizer proved most productive. As a result the G20 agreed a new cooperation for development outlook.
The presidency active collaboration with the international organizations and engagement with social partners was instrumental in harnessing their experts’ potential and enhancing the G20 transparency, legitimacy and effectiveness. The G20 institutions consolidation continued through development of new coordination mechanisms and strengthening accountability.
Under the Russian presidency the G20 reaffirmed its value as the premier economic cooperation forum. Emphasizing restoring strong and inclusive growth and employment while ensuring fiscal sustainability, the leaders for the first time in the history of the G20 stressed that the well-being of individual people should be at the center of the growth agenda. This consequential outcome of the five years collaboration might be a start of a new G20 agenda where inclusiveness is one of the pillars of growth.
Russian strategic documents highlight the significance of international cooperation for Russian education and science development. The effectiveness of such cooperation is determined by country's activities and resources that correspond to priorities and possess sufficient potential for achieving purposes. The presented article explores the agreements Russia with other countries and instruments of the international cooperation in the field of Education and Science. The author of the paper examines how bilateral and multilateral international agreements (including documents of international organizations and associations) and instruments contribute to the achievement of strategic objectives such as the improvement of research and education quality, the development of Russian education export. The author uses the database of international agreements formed in July 2013 in the framework of joint project of the International Organizations Research Institute and the National Training Foundation. The results of the analyses show that international agreements in the field of science and education do not fully comply with the country's priorities. In addition, a number of key areas of cooperation need to provide the tools for the development of partnership. It is necessary to create coordination mechanism (national strategy of international cooperation in the field of science and education), which will contribute to the harmonization of goals and actions of the country's international cooperation.
Turkey held the presidency of the G20 (Group of 20) from December 2014 to November 2015. During this period geopolitical tensions started to spread beyond the borders of the regions involved. Turkey went through a challenging time, with a slowing economy, two elections in 2015, revived political confrontations, two million refugees and frustrations in securing its borders and handling terrorism. Turkey defined three priorities for its presidency: inclusiveness, implementation and investment for growth. To combat inequality and ensure inclusive growth, it aimed to address the issues of small and medium-sized enterprises, such as access to finance, skills and global value chains, employment for youth and women, and support to the development of low-income countries. Inclusiveness was also explicit in G20 engagement with social partners. Implementation was emphasized, particularly related to the imperative to deliver on the G20 members’ commitments regarding growth strategies made at the 2014 Brisbane Summit.This article assesses the G20’s performance under the Turkey presidency within a functional paradigm focusing on the three main objectives of plurilateral summitry institutions: strengthening capacity for political leadership to launch new ideas and overcome deadlocks, reconciling domestic and international pressures, and consolidating collective management. To attain those objectives, institutions are expected to demonstrate leadership, solidarity, sustainability, acceptability, consistency and continuity. Efficiency is perceived as G20 performance on a combination of the criteria. Given the G20’s ultimate mission to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, all the issues on Turkey’s G20 agenda were grouped according to these four growth pillars.G20 performance on each of the issue areas was assessed on six criteria using a three-point scale: high (1), medium (0) and low (−1) degree of performance. The overall assessment of G20 performance efficiency was estimated as the total of the average scores in each issue area divided by 11 (the number of policy areas on the agenda). Recognizing that implementation is crucial to G20 legitimacy, leadership and solidarity, Turkey made it one of its presidency’s priorities. Thus, the quality of accountability and level of compliance are considered within each policy area. The quality of engagement is included in the assessment of the acceptability of G20 decisions within respective policy areas, with the format of G20 engagement with outreach, including social partners, international institutions and non-G20 countries, explored in a separate section.
The analysis showed that the G20 under the Turkish presidency attained a high level of consistency and continuity in all issues, ensuring the consistency of decisions across policy areas and their compatibility with the agenda of previous presidencies and G20 core agenda. Sustainability and acceptability were also quite high, as the G20 ensured the longevity of collectively produced solutions and got the endorsement of the decisions by other governments, international institutions and social partners. However, the Turkish presidency lacked leadership, showing not enough capacity to exercise political authority and overcome deadlocks, which could be partly explained by the challenges of the internal situation in Turkey. The lowest level was registered for solidarity as some G20 members did not fully commit to certain decisions and parts of the programs and documents were perceived as voluntary. The G20 displayed many of the features of plurilateral summitry institutions in all the areas under the goal of balanced growth and almost all with regard to the goal of inclusive growth. On sustainable growth, the performance was mixed on both energy and climate change. With a relatively high average for strong growth, the outcomes by issue were uneven: relatively high on macroeconomic cooperation and investment, and rather low on trade. The trade agenda was the only one with negative scores for leadership and solidarity, proving to be one of the most persistent challenges for the G20.
The paper analyses the process of creating the single electricity market in the European Union. It examines supranational efforts for creation and integration of member states' competitive electricity markets and identifies the key challenges that supranational authorities, member states and EU power supply companies face within the process of the single European electricity market development.