On the basis of the analysis of the innovation production process through the prism of institutional design and rational choice theories D. Balalaeva demonstrates that if the established institutional design aiming at protecting the status quo stays intact, the innovational system of Russia will not develop any further. Breaking through this stalemate necessitates socio-economic changes that will exert influence upon the initial distribution of power in the society and as a result will alter elitist preferences. According to the author, this process might be accelerated through the collective action undertaken by the civil society and, in particular, by the Russian scientists, aiming at the protection of intellectual property rights and improvement of Science status within the society.
The article analyzes the contribution of populism, as a phenomenon of public sentiments, to the dynamics of the recent constitutional transformations in Eastern Europe, post-Soviet space and Russia. The research shows that in all countries from the above mentioned regions populism gave impetus to the processes of constitutional retraditionalization, which affected different areas such as international and national law, constitutional identity, sovereignty, forms of government, and constitutional justice. Everywhere the mechanisms of constitutional retraditionalization invoked by populism are associated with the denial of the principles of ideological pluralism and political neutrality of constitutional justice. However, the methods used in different countries vary considerably and cover the entire gamut of technologies of constitutional revision, ranging from the “conservative revolution” through convoking a constituent assembly or holding a national referendum to changing preambles of constitutions, introducing constitutional amendments, judicial interpretation, as well as a wide range of extra-constitutional mechanisms. The choice of a particular technology or a combination of technologies is determined by the level of public support for populist forces and the degree of their control over government institutions. Populism in Eastern Europe, post-Soviet space and Russia performs different functions. In the first case populism represents a way of accumulating protest against imperfect institutions; in the second case populism is a form of a struggle for establishing rules of the game; in the third case populism performs a function of mobilizing support for the current political regime, or a means of legitimizing it. In Eastern Europe constitutional populism serves as an instrument for achieving power, in the post-Soviet region — for its redistribution, and in Russia — for its preservation. On the basis of these differences, the author identifies three versions of constitutional populism — “democratic” (Eastern Europe), “oligarchic” (post-Soviet region), and “plebiscite”, controlled and directed by power holders themselves (Russia).
The article traces possible channels of influence of a religious factor on the formation of a specific Russian version of socialism. Using the logics of the M. Weber's work "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", I. Zabaev reveals the categories that played a dominating role in the people's consciousness in the pre-revolutionary Russia. According to his conclusion, these categories were "obedience" and "resignation". It was obedience and resignation that assured the salvation (main value in Orthodoxy) of an Orthodox person. In everyday life such orientations were easily transformed into the readiness to obey the "superior". Once elaborated, they turned to be quite stable and, being separated from their religious roots, ensured a sort of asceticism on the secular path.
The article explains why the first attempt to introduce constitutional review in Russia failed. A simple model that predicts institutional characteristics of constitutional courts is devised based on configuration of elites that create the court and their prospects of keeping power. The case of Russia is examined against this model. I explain the existent departures from the predictions of the model by the fact that while playing with the court the elites also played other games which led them to making suboptimal decisions. Making too many of those (including making the court's powers excessively large and unspecified and nominating wrong justices) caused the project's failure.