The main point of paper is that China's rapid economic development, which began in 1970s, had a positive and negative impact on the development of leaders and talents in Chinese companies. Despite the fact, that China is a developing economy with a large population, it also lacks labor. On the one hand, the rapid growth of the companies helped qualified specialists quickly occupy leading positions, but, on the other hand, companies faced the problem of finding qualified managers. Companies began to realize that short-term tasks run counter to the long-term goals of talent development, so they began to look for ways to search for the talents from outside. At the present moment main priority of the Chinese employment policy is returning highly qualified specialists who have received education abroad. According to statistics, from 1998 to 2008, the number of students returning to China reached 370 thousand, since 2000 their number has increased every year by 13%, and in 2008 reached 57,5% of the total number of people who went abroad to study. The Chinese government provide material support to the returned Chinese talents. For example, in 1992 the State Natural Science Foundation of China established a special fund that provides short-term financial support to students who received education abroad and returned to China. In 2008 was established the first venture fund, which supported the projects of Chinese students returning from abroad. Basically, investment goes to such areas as biotechnology, the IT and high technology enterprises that can replace heavy industry and bring China to a new level. Despite the large number of advantages that talents can receive by returning to China, there are a number of reasons why many of them do not want to return. The conclusion is that the general reasons are low living standards of the population, the large gap between social strata, a bad ecological situation, etc.
The article explores the British general election 2015 in close connection with institutional and political transformation of the United Kingdom. At first sight, the election results – the conservative majority government – correspond with a two-party system, traditional for Westminster democracy. But the analysis of the election results leads to conclusion that the party system configuration is changing. The Conservative Party won not only because of the “first-past-the-post” electoral system which enhanced the first party's number of seats, but due to complex factors: satisfactory results of the coalition government’s economic policy and a successful electoral campaign. An important moment for the Conservatives' victory was the political context. The growth of political actors such as SNP and UKIP threatened the Labourists’ support among Scottish electorate and low-skilled white working class in England. The election recorded that center-left parties were defeated, whereas protest parties, both left and right ones, increased their share of votes significantly. So, it reflected the rising fragmentation and polarization of the party system. Sartori’s typology as applied to the election results shows that Britain undergoes a transition process to a polarized pluralism system. British political practice confirms the key features of this type: growth of anti-system parties, bilaterial opposition to government and centrifugal tendencies. The prime explanation of the contradictory election results is the institutional framework. A majority election system restrains multipartism at the parliamentary level by reproducing a dualistic party competition in constituencies. The ongoing devolution, in turn, has led to regionalization of electoral behavior, which increases the percentage of votes for regional parties (Scottish National Party in Scotland, United Kingdom Independence Party in England) and promotes multipartism. Brexit as another "institutional shock" and a manifestation of the conflict between center and periphery has an impact on the British party system. The results of the referendum play the regions one off against another, thereby giving new urgency to the problem of ethnic separatism and encouraging the further development of the multiparty system. On this basis, the current institutional system favors regional actors that receive a double gain. Today, the development of the institutional structure enhances disproportion in political representation, imbalance in inter-regional relations and the separatist risk. The British political class faces a complex set of problems, as far as the country is undergoing a period of a profound transformation of its political system and needs an adaptation to these processes.
The first wave of the civil war in Libya, which ended after the assassination of Muammar Qaddafi in the fall of 2011, did not put an end to the civil conflict in the country. It is shown that in many respects the second wave of the civil war in Libya (the beginning of the active phase of which can be dated May 16, 2014) was a direct continuation of the first wave (February–October 2011). By 2014, it became clear that the Libyan crisis could not be resolved solely through a change in political regime. The revolutionary processes in the case of Libya proved to be fatal for the entire political system, marking the almost complete dismantling of state institutions. Thus, the overthrow of the dictator in Libya did not ultimately solve anything, and the military-political forces that fought in the first wave of civil conflict against Muammar Qaddafi launched an open full-scale armed struggle with each other in May 2014, marking the beginning of the second wave of civil war. This article analyzes the logic and course of the second wave of the civil war in Libya, as well as explores the genesis of key military and political forces in Libya after 2011. The authors conclude that at present time a stalemate has developed in the country. And the impossibility of a military victory for either side of the Libyan conflict allows us to hope for a new agreement between all its parties.
The article discusses the evolution of the Visegrad partnership. It never had integrative capacity, but in recent years accumulated the integration potential in regional relations. The common position formation principles in international policy are being carried out by the Visegrad Four. Notable is the emergence of really important issues and explicit politicization of the agenda. The defense theme, the problem of energy security, coordination of positions on the EU budget etc. were included into discussions. At the same time, exacerbated contradictions exist in these areas. Key factors currently affecting the development of the Visegrad Group are: the confrontation of great powers in the region, the inert nature of relationship between the Visegrad countries and the United States, the anarchy in European policy, the prevalence of extra-regional conditions and incentives, the lack of specific regional rules and the void of its institutionalization. The Ukrainian crisis once again emphasizes the importance of the regional policy external actors – the U.S., Germany, Russia and the Brussels EU's bureaucracy. It was the cause of the schism emerging in East European politics and slowed down the process of the intra-regional incentives formation as well as of the communications concentration. It is forcing the Visegrad countries to grasp their limitrophe position. A perspective of the Visegrad partnership is unclear, but it is noteworthy that regional relations become increasingly important for their participants.
In 2013, the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences began a study of black communities in the USA. By now, the research was conducted in six states (Alabama, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania); in a number of towns as well as in the cities of Boston, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The study shows that diasporas as network communities have already formed among recent migrants from many African countries in the US. These are diasporas of immigrants from individual countries; not a single “African diaspora”.
On the one hand, diasporas as an important phenomenon of globalization should become objects of global governance by means of regulation at the transnational level of both migration streams and foreign-born communities norms of existence. On the other hand, diasporas can be agents of social and political global governance, of essentially transnational impact on individual societies and states, migrant sending as well as accepting. The evidence on the African diasporas in the USA confirm these arguments.
Most American Africans believe that diasporas must and can take active part in the home countries’ public life. However, the majority of them concentrates on targeted assistance to certain people – their loved ones back home. The forms of this assistance are diverse, but the main of them is sending remittances. At the same time, the money received from migrants by specific people makes impact on the whole society and state. For many African states these remittances form a significant part of national income. The migrants’ remittances allow the states to lower the level of social tension. Simultaneously, they have to be especially thorough while building relationships with the migrant accepting countries and with diasporas themselves.
Africans constitute an absolute minority among recent migrants in the USA. Nevertheless, directly or indirectly, they exert a certain influence on the establishment of the principles of social life and state politics (home and foreign) of not only native countries but also of the accepting one, the US. This confirms the argument that elaboration of norms and setting the rules of global governance is the business of not only political actors but of the globalizing civil society, its institutions and organizations either. The most recent example of this is public debates in the American establishment, including President Obama, on the problem of immigration policy and relationships with migrant sending states provoked by the 2014 US–Africa Leaders Summit. Remarkably, the African diasporas, in the persons of their leaders, actively joined the discussion and openly declared that the state pays insufficiently little attention to the migrants’ needs and insisted on taking their position into account while planning immigration reform.
However, Africans are becoming increasingly less “invisible” in the American society not only in connection with loud but infrequent specific events. Not a few educated Africans who have managed to achieve a decent social status and financial position for themselves, have a desire to promote not just the adaptation of migrants from Africa, but to make their collective voice heard in American society and the state at the local and national levels. Their efforts take different forms but most often they result in establishing and running of various organizations of the diaspora. These associations become new cells of American civil society and in this capacity affect the society itself, and the institutions of government best of their ability.
Thus, the evidence on Africans in the USA shows that diasporas are both objects (to date, mainly potential) and real subjects of global governance. They influence public life, home and foreign policy of the migrant sending African countries and of migrant accepting United States, make a modest but undeniable contribution to the principles and mechanisms of management of global phenomena and processes.
The article focuses on the influence of global climate change on the world economy. The author points out that this influence is broader than damage from the transformation of environment caused by climate change and involves the variety of issues including impacts on the technological progress and formation of new carbon markets. Special attention is paid to the role of intergovernmental regulation and the composition of climate policy which change as the influence of climate change grows. Climate policy passes to the national level and switches to the priority of adaptation measures.
The article explores the key trends in R&D and innovation activities of the world’s largest oil & gas companies through the lens of dynamic shifts taking place in the competitive landscape of the global energy sector. The first area, where the author sees significant changes, relates to the appearance of the new powerful players in the technological domain of the world oil and gas industry. He draws attention to the growing roles of national oil companies and multinational oilfield service firms as increasingly important investors in R&D and innovations. These developments are analyzed in the context of the overall competitive positioning of Western-based supermajors whose technological dominance in the industry has never seriously been challenged before. Another significant change, noticed by the author, relates to the new technological priorities set by the world’s largest oil & gas companies for the foreseeable future. Two major sets of technologies are becoming increasingly important as strategic areas for investment by the industry giants. One of them, low-carbon technologies, reflects the dramatic evolution of the ‘Big Oil’ attitude to the so-called Energy transition. In contrast to a largely negativist (or at best ‘window-dressing’) approach to climate agenda, visible just a decade ago, most oil & gas giants have recently adopted individual low-carbon strategies driven to a large extent by the significantly increased pressure from the powerful institutional investors and the growing influence of the negative public opinion. The second top technological priority relates to the changing digital agenda in the oil and gas industry. It reflects the transition of the industry leaders to the next generation digital technologies (including internet of things, artificial intelligence, machine learning and robotics) but most importantly to a systemic approach in digital transformation contrasting with traditional ‘piecemeal’ IT projects with limited operations coverage. The changing innovation management mechanisms are also considered by the author as one of the key trends in technological domain of the world oil and gas industry. Specific focus is devoted to the formation of the corporate innovation ecosystems, including various R&D and innovation collaborations with different innovation actors (business partners, professional research centers, universities and governments organizations) and the connected vast spread of open innovation-based instruments working within these alliances.
Public finance and entrepreneurship are interlinked by numerous ties. Primarily, these are the tax system and social insurance payments. The principles of respective governmental expenditures should be installed in the framework of the conciliation between the state, business and the employee. The analysis shows that in today’s Russia, the balance between the interests of the state (implemented, among other mechanisms, through the budgetary system) and the business has not been found yet. There is a clear dominance of the executive branch of authority over the legislative branch. This leads to the adoption of insufficiently neat decisions that have highly negatively impact on the entrepreneurship. The problem has fully been manifested, in particular, by the latest reform of the pension system, as well by the continuing efforts of both companies and individuals to evade from the taxation. No less important is the interaction between the state and business in improving the quality of human capital and, first of all, of the high education and vocational training for the domestic labour market. Until now the situation here is quite unsatisfactory. The problems start from the level of school education, the quality of which does not meet the modern requirements. Easy access to higher education in our country is largely ified by its low quality. This creates a critical shortage of qualified specialists at the domestic labor market. An important manifestation of continuing inefficiency of the Russian state can be seen in the sphere of drafting of strategic documents on the development of the national economy and social sphere in the medium term. The situation is further exacerbated due to the deceleration of economic growth and the inability of the state to maintain habitual social standards for all groups of population. Under the current conditions it is likely that Russian business will face additional burden of taxes and social insurance contributions.