Since the 2000s electronic auctions have been actively used in public and private procurement in many countries. They are often organized by intermediaries – specialized e-platforms, which seem to raise price competition between companies through increased transparency and lower participation costs. Meanwhile, it is not clear yet to what consequences e-auctions lead, if an e-platform is corrupt. In this paper we examine how a corrupt e-platform affects favoritism in public procurement using a theoretical model of reverse outcry auction and e-auction. In both auction formats a public procurer can restrict participation of companies by setting contract requirements that all companies may not execute. In addition to this, in e-auction intermediary can block actions (i.e. bids) of companies. Manipulation of contract requirements and blocking bids provide an opportunity for public procurer and intermediary, respectively, to take bribes. We show that even if participation costs have no effect on the decision of companies to enter the auction, e-auction with a corrupt intermediary may lead to lower possibilities for favoritism than outcry auction. If the preferred bidder carries out low production costs, corruption of e-platform encourages favoritism. On the contrary, if the preferred bidder carries out high production costs and meets the strict requirements of the public procurer, incentives for favoritism and the size of the bribe may decrease. Thus, corruption of e-platform replaces the corruption of the public procurer and the society can benefit from it.
The lecture course «Firm-level Empirical Surveys: Tools and Practice» is a special course for students specializing in institutional analysis, firm economy and management. These lectures are helpful for development of research capabilities of graduate and post-graduate students. The goal of the course is to provide a descrip-tion of empirical firm-level surveys: history of their development in Russia, methods and types of information, and possible application for economic theory and state policy design. One of important objectives of the course is to promote students' propensity to study realities of Russian economy by implementing empirical firm-level studies based on surveys of top-managers and owners of enterprises. Survey methodology for obtaining data is one of the most popular in sociology. At the same time application of these methods and tools in firm-level economic analysis - especially in combination with traditionally applied economic methods and data - has specific features. Working with managers' surveys data is not very com-mon for economists and they are often incorrect in their interpretations of results. That's why the course based on long experience in conducting empirical surveys of Russian enterprises describes possible ways for data collection and analysis based on real or adjusted cases, and also discusses limitations of surveys tools including quality of data and typical mistakes in analysis. The course includes four main topics. The first one published in this issue con-sists of two lectures. They describe an enterprise (firm) as an object for empirical research and possible types of available information. Two next topics characterize the most wide-spread types of surveys methodology and tools: formalized surveys and in-depth interviews with CEOs and top-managers of companies. Last topic is devoted to the development of applied firm-level studies of Russian businesses in 1990-2000s.
The fourth and conclusive topic of the lecture course «Firm-level Empirical Surveys: Tools and Practice» is presented in this issue. The topic «Empirical studies of Russian enterprises behavior: subject-matters and methods» includes two lectures and describes emergence and development of applied empirical studies of Russian enterprises behavior in 1990-2000th and ways of improvement methodology for collecting and analyzing data. Examples of implemented research project illustrating the history of development firm-level surveys are considered. In conclusion of the course we return to discussion of the key issue of quality of empirical information and means of its improvement. Besides, special recommendation for organization of seminars and check of students' learning are presented.
Topic 2. Formalized surveys of enterprises top-managers: a tool for evaluations based on qualitative information The second topic of the lecture course «Firm-level Empirical Surveys: Tools and Practice» is presented in this issue. The topic describes possibilities and practice of application of formalized top-managers surveys to studies of enterprises economic behavior. The main attention is focused on development of surveys methodology and tools, and technology of their conducting. Limitations and advantages of surveys and distortion of their data characterizing enterprises state behavior are discussed.
The third topic of the lecture course «Firm-Level Empirical Surveys: Tools and Practice» is presented in this issue. The topic «Qualitative information: tools for collection and analysis of data» includes two lectures and describes existing methodology and application of qualitative research to firms behavior studies: in-depth interviews, case-studies and focus groups. Special attention is paid to organization of an empirical survey as a set of in-depth interviews with top-managers of enterprises including methodology, field-work procedures and questionnaires. Limitations and advantages of top-managers interviewing as a tool of collecting qualitative information and its possible distortion are discussed.
We investigate the relative effectiveness of the projection methods of Supply and Use tables in relation to Use tables. The empirical bases of the study are the Use tables of 28 countries for the period from 1995 to 2010 from WIOD project. We conduct a comparative study of three mathematical methods that have proven the most effective in constructing projection of Use tables for Spain and the Netherlands from the investigation of Temurshoev, Webb, and Yamano (2011).The most effective of these methods is GRAS, a version of the classical RAS algorithm. The results of applying this method under the number of criteria are closer to the published tables than the results of the INSD method and Kuroda method, which are based on quadratic programming. We conclude that GRAS method is a priority in the extrapolation of Use tables for Russia.
This paper analyses the impact of inequality in wealth distribution on the strength of property rights in non-democratic countries. We construct the model with asymmetric rent-seeking contest and endogenous institutions to demonstrate that the impact of inequality on property rights is non monotonous and conditional on a) what the inequality is driven by: higher aggregate wealth of the ruling class (elite) or its lower share in population; b) how high is the level of inequality, which determines the equilibrium type, conflict regime (with unproductive rent-seeking behavior) or social contract; c) the size of ruling class, i.e. how limited is the access to power. More asymmetry in wealth distribution between the elite and the masses indeed leads to the emergence of the conflict equilibrium. However, as long as economy rests in conflict, the quality of property rights positively depends on the wealth of the elite, but negatively depends on the tightness of the elite class. For this reason, countries with wide-enough ruling class may establish strong institutions both under very high and low levels of inequality, while intermediate cases lead to worse institutions. Moreover, high wealth inequality leads to lower conflict intensity. Consequently, in countries with the most narrow elite lower inequality does not contribute to better institutions, but only increases conflict intensity. We use the results of our model to explain the existent substantial differences in the quality of property rights institutions between non-democratic regimes, and also interpret some historical cases of institutional development in (post)colonial periods and nowadays.
The paper looks at the impact of imperfect assessment of water discharge on the level of surface water pollution and allocation of environmental budget in a framework of one river basin region. Analysis is based on the partial equilibrium model with unidirectional spatially accumulated external effect in the presence of partial natural absorbtion. The effect of water discharge assessment imperfection on the level of water pollution at every location and social welfare is investigated. It is shown that decentralization accompanied by the improvement in water discharge quality assessment may reduce the welfare loss. However, even under complete elimination of assessment imperfections resource allocation under decentralization is still inefficient.
качество воды, потери в благосостоянии, искажения в оценке загрязнения, децентрализация, Water discharge quality, welfare loss, imperfect assessment, Decentralization
This paper is devoted to the public-private wage gap in Russia. Wage gap is estimated with the use both of the mean and the quantile regressions, which will provide a more complex picture of the public-private sector wage gap distribution. The author finds the existence of significant public-private wage gap (about 30%) considering both observable and unobservable characteristics of workers and jobs. Decomposition based on quantile regression helps to answer the question about the nature of the wage differences. The author comes to the conclusion that the main reason for the gap is the institutional mechanisms of public sector in Russia. The analysis is based on the data from RLMS-HSE 2000-2010.