The paper investigates the variety of peer effects on individual performance in a team sport. The individual performance of more than 5,000 soccer players, from 234 teams, between 2010 and 2015, is measured with the help of the FIFA video game simulator developed by EA Sports. The study reveals positive peer effects on individual performance although the marginal benefit decreases. Additionally, team cohesion contributes to an improvement of players’ ranking.
This study estimates the relationship between production and salary structure in Major League Soccer (MLS), the highest level of professional soccer (association football) in North America. Soccer production, measured as league-points-per-game, is modeled as a function of a team’s total wage bill, the distribution of the team’s wage bill, and goals per game. Both the gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation are utilized to measure salary inequality. The results indicate that production in MLS is negatively responsive to increases in the salary inequality; the estimation model with the best fit uses the coefficient of variation to measure dispersion. Furthermore, MLS teams appear to be constrained in their choices of salary inequality by the salary cap and other regulations.
The economics literature related to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (re)opens the discussion of whether the fans’ perceptions of competitive balance are in line with Rottenberg’s and Neale’s theory. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the effect of fans’ perceptions of suspensefulness on their willingness-to-pay for a single-game ticket and evaluating monetarily the (un)importance of competitive balance. Results suggest that fans’ notions of competitiveness influence their spending behavior, rising as perceived balance rises, at least up to high levels of competitiveness.
In sport tournaments, the rules are presumably structured in a way that any participant cannot benefit by losing instead of winning. We show that tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knockout tournaments with noncumulative prizes, which are ubiquitous around the world, are generically incentive incompatible. We use our model to discuss potential remedies and applications.