We describe a compact dual-wavelength (1.047 and 1.053 μm) diode end-pumped Q-switched Nd:YLE laser source which has a number of applications in demand. In order to achieve its dual-wavelength operation it is suggested for the first time to use essentially nonmonotonous dependences of the threshold pump powers at these wavelengths on the cavity length in the region of the cavity semiconfocal configuration under a radius of the pump beam smaller than the radius of the zero Gaussian mode. Here we demonstrate one of the most interesting applications for this laser: difference frequency generation in a GaSe crystal at a frequency of 1.64 THz. A superconducting hot-electron bolometer is used to detect the THz power generated and to measure its pulse characteristics.
We discuss the photon number splitting attack (PNS) in systems of quantum cryptography with phase coding. It is shown that this attack, as well as the structural equations for the PNS attack for phase encoding, differs physically from the analogous attack applied to the polarization coding. As far as we know, in practice, in all works to date processing of experimental data has been done for phase coding, but using formulas for polarization coding. This can lead to inadequate results for the length of the secret key. These calculations are important for the correct interpretation of the results, especially if it concerns the criterion of secrecy in quantum cryptography.
Dielectric-loaded surface plasmon− polariton waveguides (DLSPPWs) are a practically
valuable type of plasmonic waveguide. The properties of DLSPPWs at telecommunication
wavelengths have been studied in detail. However, the efficient optical excitation of DLSPPWs
in the visible spectral range has still not been realized. In this work, we present the results of
our experimental investigations of DLSPPWs in the visible spectral range. In addition, a new
configuration for the excitation and detection of the DLSPPW mode has been proposed and
realized. The propagation of plasmon wave up to a distance of 45 μ m in the DLSPPW has
In this letter we present estimates for the distance of secret key transmission through free space for three different protocols of quantum key distribution: for BB84 and phase timecoding protocols in the case of a strictly single-photon source, and for the relativistic quantum key distribution protocol in the case of faint laser pulses.
A new protocol for quantum key distribution through empty space is proposed. Apart from the quantum mechanical restrictions on distinguishability of non-orthogonal states, the protocol employs additional restrictions imposed by special relativity. The protocol ensures generation of a secure key even for the source generating non-strictly single-photon quantum states and for arbitrary losses in quantum communication channel.
A novel method is proposed for highly sensitive surface spectroscopy based on hole burning in the surface plasmon polariton (SPP) quantum generator spectrum due to absorption by analyzed molecules or clusters located inside the SPP cavity. The SPP quantum generator spectrum is calculated with an account of inhomogeneous broadening due to variations of the active medium transition frequency. The influence of an analyzed sample on the generation spectrum is demonstrated. The realization of the SPP generator spectroscopy based on a 2D cavity is proposed. It is shown that a SPP quantum generator with a sufficiently large cavity is qualitatively different from the usual laser. In particular, the SPP generation mode is not identical to the passive cavity mode and it appears only due to the active medium. Thus, such kinds of SPP generation cannot be described by the usual single-mode approach and one needs to solve the corresponding spatial problem. The sensitivity of the proposed plasmonic generator intracavity spectroscopy method is calculated.
The well-known Hong–Ou–Mandel effect is revisited. Two physical reasons are discussed for the effect to be less pronounced or even to disappear: differing polarizations of photons coming to the beamsplitter and delay time of photons in one of two channels. For the latter we use the concepts of biphoton frequency and temporal wave functions depending, correspondingly, on two frequency continuous variables of photons and on two time variables t1 and t2 interpreted as the arrival times of photons to the beamsplitter. Explicit expressions are found for the probability densities and total probabilities for photon pairs to be split between two channels after the beamsplitter and to be unsplit, when two photons appear together in one of two channels.
In the paper by Gleim et al (2016 Opt. Express 24 2619), it was declared that the system of quantum cryptography, exploiting quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 with the additional reference state and encoding in a sub-carrier, is able to distribute secret keys at a distance of 210 km. The following shows that a simple attack realized with a beam splitter results in a loss of privacy of the keys over substantially smaller distances. It turns out that the actual length of the secret key transmission for the QKD system encoding in the sub-carrier frequency is ten times less than that declared in Gleim et al (2016 Opt. Express 24 2619). Therefore it is impossible to safely use the keys when distributed at a larger length of the communication channel than shown below. The maximum communication distance does not exceed 22 km, even in the most optimistic scenario.
We theoretically investigate a phase-matching (PM) between HE11 and HE13 modes at wavelengths 1596 and 532 nm, respectively, of real germania-silica fiber wave guides, whose perform was made by MCDVD technology. For several measured refractive index profiles of the fiber perform the corresponding waveguide diameters, providing homogeneous PM, both with modal dispersion and power characteristics are calculated. The PM parameters obtained for the real fiber are compared to that calculated for a standard step-index fiber model.
The problem of quantum key distribution security in channels with large losses is still open. Quasi-single-photon sources of quantum states with losses in the quantum communication channel open up the possibility of attacking with unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurements, resulting in a loss of privacy. In this letter, the problem is solved by counting the classic reference pulses. Conservation of the number of counts of intense coherent pulses makes it impossible to conduct USD measurements. Moreover, the losses in the communication channel are considered to be unknown in advance and are subject to change throughout the series parcels. Unlike other protocols, differential phase shift (Inoue et al 2002 Phys. Rev. Lett. 89 037902, Inoue et al 2003 Phys. Rev. A 68 022317, Takesue et al 2007 Nat. Photon. 1 343, Wen et al 2009 Phys. Rev. Lett. 103 170503) and coherent one way (Stucki et al 2005 Appl. Phys. Lett. 87 194108, Branciard et al 2005 Appl. Phys. Lett. 87 194108, Branciard et al 2008 New J. Phys. 10 013031, Stucki et al 2008 Opt. Express 17 13326), the simplicity of the protocol makes it possible to carry out a complete analysis of its security.