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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 10
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Article
Karpov A. V. Operations Research Letters. 2016. Vol. 44. No. 6. P. 706-711.

A new set of axioms and new method (equal gap seeding) are designed. The equal gap seeding is the unique seeding that, under the deterministic domain assumption, satisfies the delayed confrontation, fairness, increasing competitive intensity and equal rank differences axioms. The equal gap seeding is the unique seeding that, under the linear domain assumption, maximizes the probability that the strongest participant is the winner, the strongest two participants are the finalists, the strongest four participants are the quarterfinalists, etc.

Added: Sep 21, 2016
Article
Brinkhuis J., Protasov V. Y. Operations Research Letters. 2016. Vol. 44. No. 3. P. 400-402.

We present an elementary self-contained proof for the Lagrange multiplier rule. It does not refer to any preliminary material and it is only based on the observation that a certain limit is positive. At the end of this note, the power of the Lagrange multiplier rule is analyzed.

Added: Jun 4, 2016
Article
Moulin H., Aziz H., Sandomirskiy F. Operations Research Letters. 2020. Vol. 48. No. 5. P. 573-578.

We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. We show that there exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that always computes an allocation satisfying Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item even if the utilities are mixed and the agents have asymmetric weights. The result does not hold if either of Pareto optimality or PROP1 is replaced with slightly stronger concepts.

Added: Aug 25, 2020
Article
Borrero J., Gillen C., Prokopyev O. Operations Research Letters. 2016. Vol. 44. No. 4. P. 479-486.

We consider reformulations of fractional (hyperbolic) 0-1 programming problems as equivalent mixed-integer linear programs (MILP). The key idea of the proposed technique is to exploit binary representations of certain linear combinations of the 0-1 decision variables. Consequently, under some mild conditions, the number of product terms that need to be linearized can be greatly decreased. We perform numerical experiments comparing the proposed approach against the previous MILP reformulations used in the literature. 

Added: Sep 17, 2016
Article
A.Y. Golubin. Operations Research Letters. 2013. Vol. 41. No. 6. P. 636-638.

The paper suggests a new --- to the best of the author's knowledge --- characterization of Pareto-optimal decisions for the case of two-dimensional utility space which is not supposed to be convex. The main idea is to use the angle distances between the bisector of the first quadrant and points of utility space. A necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto optimality in the form of an equation is derived. The first-order necessary condition for optimality in the form of a pair of equations is also obtained.

Added: Oct 10, 2013
Article
Karademir S., Prokopyev O. Operations Research Letters. 2015. Vol. 43. No. 5. P. 537-544.

We consider a class of convex mixed-integer nonlinear programs motivated by speed scaling of heterogeneous parallel processors with sleep states and convex power consumption curves. We show that the problem is NP-hard and identify some polynomially solvable classes. Furthermore, a dynamic programming and a greedy approximation algorithms are proposed to obtain a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for a special case. For the general case, we implement an outer approximation algorithm.

Added: Oct 19, 2016
Article
V. V. Gusev, Mazalov V. V. Operations Research Letters. 2019. Vol. 47. No. 6. P. 478-482.

The existence of a Nash-stable coalition structure in cooperative games with the Aumann–Dreze value is investigated. Using the framework of potential functions, it is proved that such a coalition structure exists in any cooperative game. In addition, a similar result is established for some linear values of the game, in particular, the Banzhaf value. For a cooperative game with vector payments, a type of stability based on maximizing the guaranteed payoffs of all players is proposed.

Added: Sep 30, 2020
Article
Kuzyutin D., Громова Е. В., Pankratova Y. Operations Research Letters. 2018. Vol. 46. No. 6. P. 557-562.

We use the imputation distribution procedure approach to ensure sustainable cooperation in a multistage game with vector payoffs. In order to choose a particular Pareto optimal and time consistent strategy profile and the corresponding cooperative trajectory we suggest a refined leximin algorithm. Using this algorithm we design a characteristic function for a multistage multicriteria game. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for strong time consistency of the core. 

Added: Nov 6, 2018
Article
Kuzyutin D., Gromova E., Pankratova Y. Operations Research Letters. 2018. Vol. 46. No. 6. P. 557-562.

We use the imputation distribution procedure approach to ensure sustainable cooperation in a multistage game with vector payoffs. In order to choose a particular Pareto optimal and time consistent strategy profile and the corresponding cooperative trajectory we suggest a refined leximin algorithm. Using this algorithm we design a characteristic function for a multistage multicriteria game. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for strong time consistency of the core.

Added: Oct 8, 2019
Article
Kuzyutin D., Nikitina M. Operations Research Letters. 2017. Vol. 45. No. 3. P. 269-274.

To ensure sustainable cooperation in multistage games with vector payoffs we use the payment schedule based approach. The main dynamic properties of cooperative solutions used in single-criterion multistage games are extended to multicriteria games.

We design two recurrent payment schedules that satisfy such advantageous properties as the efficiency and the time consistency conditions, non-negativity and irrational behavior proofness.

Added: Oct 24, 2016