This paper looks at the urban development of transition countries in 1991–2010, primarily focusing on the last decade. Cities in transition face a unique set of challenges that came forth due to interplay of the legacy of socialist urban policies and the transition to the market economy. The socialist urban policies restrained growth of the largest cities and distorted the spatial equilibrium towards more uniform distribution of urban population. The transition to the market economy reduces distortions, but the convergence is slow. Housing market rigidities, inadequate urban infrastructure, and inconsistent government policies prevent people from moving to the largest cities.
We study the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and sys-
temic risk for nine European countries in January 2010–September 2016 by apply-
ing conventional Granger causality tests and advanced techniques (wavelet analy-
sis and Bayesian VARs). The country-level analyses show that the lead-lag patterns
vary considerably in the short and longer run as well as at diﬀerent frequencies.
Nonetheless, the pivotal role of uncertainty tends to strengthen over longer time
horizons (at lower frequencies) and in the BVAR framework. This is true for ﬁnan-
cially fragile economies such as Ireland, Italy, Russia, Spain. A panel BVAR model
conﬁrms this ﬁnding for the whole sample.
Since formal laws can be observed or ignored to varying degrees, the actual enforcement regime shapes incentives and constraints. Most of the studies exploring EPL effects on labour market performance implicitly assume that EPL compliance is near to complete and therefore all firms bear full adjustment costs incurred by the regulations. This seems to be a very strong assumption for any country but it sounds especially strong and hardly plausible for developing and transition economies. But if compliance and enforcement varies widely across regions/cities or segments of firms, then this variation is likely to cause variation in performance. This paper looks at Russia in particular. The main idea of this paper is to analize cross-regional and inter-temporal variation in EPL enforcement and to explore empirically whether it is translated into regional labour market outcomes. The paper employs unique data set based on the State Labour Inspectorate data and the Supreme Court statistics on labour disputes.
Which incentives have the strongest impact on the size of the informal economy? Is it about government’s pressure against entrepreneurs operating in this sector, or is it about the benefits of legality? The goal of this paper is to explicitly contrast the role of sticks (court repressiveness) and carrots (financial aid to small and medium-sized firms) as factors determining the size of the informal economy, using the case of the Russian taxi market. It uses a unique dataset of taxi licensing data from regional transport departments and indicators for taxi market demand and supply to estimate the extent of informal business. When controlling for market demand and supply, it finds a strong and robust positive effect of sanctions on the size of the official market, with higher repressiveness leading to a smaller informal economy. In contrast, the effect of carrots was insignificant. The results suggest that the effectiveness of carrot policies is compromised when entrepreneurs operate informally to avoid dealing with corrupt bureaucrats and have low trust in the government.
Using comparable 2002-2011 data, authors examine the effect off oil on grouwth of Russia's regions and American states.