The idea that Russia and the United States should work together to combat international terrorism is not new, and has already become a banality. But experience confirms time and time again that this cooperation is a must.
One hopes that the wise decision of Moscow and Washington to prevent the ballistic missile defense (BMD) issue from hindering the improvement of their relations will ultimately help them to see the unimportance of their BMD deadlock and to focus instead on the issues that really matter. If they do, they will not have to cancel any more summits in the future.
Chinese geoeconomics is making a great leap forward to adjust to rapid technological developments and a changing international distribution of power. The world is entering a new industrial revolution that further decouples the relationship between capital and labour, which incentivises Beijing to abandon its reliance on low-wage competitiveness and instead take the lead in developing high-tech strategic industries with its digital Silk Road. Technological leadership in the new industrial revolution is funded by the scale of demand, which China is ﬁ lling by monopolizing on the growing Chinese domestic market and strengthening economic connectivity with the world. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) restructures global value chains as new transportation and energy corridors lead to China, which are ﬁ nanced by Chinese-led international ﬁ nancial instruments. Russia and China are becoming natural allies due to the shared objective of restructuring global value chains and developing a multipolar world. China offers a model for developing national technological platforms as an imperative asset in modern geoeconomics. Furthermore, China’s BRI is harmonized with Russia’s own ambitions for increased economic connectivity in Greater Eurasia. Western sanctions that would in the past have marginalized Russia from international market are now merely pushing Russia towards China-centric global value chains. To the detriment of both Russia and the West, sanctions are making Russia excessively reliant on China by undermining Moscow’s ability to diversify its economic connectivity and technological autonomy. The ‘new Cold War’ is relegating Russia to an asymmetrical partnership with China aimed to construct a multipolar world order. Concurrently, the West is developing increasingly unfavourable asymmetry with China as an adversary challenging Western-centric value chains.
No fundamental changes in the Russian-American dialogue on human rights have occurred since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidential office in Russia. Putin's comeback has not changed the dominant realistic approach to the foreign policy pursued by the Obama administration, which still seeks not to make relations with Russia dependent on its democratization. With all its domestic political liberalism and abundance of foreign policy liberals, the Obama administration is pursuing the most realistic and least ideology-driven foreign policy in U.S. history since the end of the Cold War. It was Washington's refusal to pursue an overly ideological foreign policy that has made the reset policy between the U.S. and Russia possible.
McFaul’s appointment shows that U.S. policy on Russia will retain the same high level of priority for Obama in 2013-2016 that it did during his first term. As the president’s special assistant, McFaul has already fulfilled his mission by introducing the “reset.”
The atmosphere in which the leaders of Russia and the EU are meeting for their 30th summit in December is one of ambivalence. On the one hand, they have developed a firm institutional basis with the Russia-EU summit at its core, complemented by numerous meetings in various formats and active cooperation between officials. On the other hand, Russia and Europe have not yet overcome the zero-sum philosophy and mentality, in which one party's gains result only from equivalent losses or concessions by another party.
While developing their counter-terrorist cooperation, Russia and the United States should remember that, like in the 2000s, it will not be sufficient to ensure a stable strategic partnership. Failure to overcome the philosophy of mutual deterrence will mean that Russia and the United States are unable to reach a level of cooperation where backsliding is no longer possible.
In several years from now the US-Russia relations might find themselves in a situation where the positive cooperative agenda will shrink or marginalize, while the negative one will grow both in size and importance, and Russia could again color the US as a major threat to its military and political security.
Elaboration of the joint assessment of terrorist threats by Russia and the United States would create a solid foundation for anti-terrorist cooperation (such as exchange of information and conduct of joint operations). It would also help the two countries to bring their political approaches to the said regions closer together.
Policy brief " What Asia wants, or the "Four C's": Consumption, Connectivity, Capital & Creativity" is the first paper prepared within the framework of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club research program. The theme for the first note, which opens the Club’s new research program, was not chosen randomly. In recent years, Asia has made a serious claim as a new economic and political center of the world, and the region's role on the international arena is growing rapidly. The authors underscore the need for debunking the old stereotypes, the most illustrious of which is the label "made in China", pointing to the poor quality of products made in the Middle Kingdom, as well as the neighboring developing countries. But Asia is no longer to be the workshop of the world and to flood the planet with cheap consumer goods; it begins to live for itself and to produce for itself. The note addresses the four necessary conditions for such a qualitative change in the internal development of the region: consumption, interconnectedness, capital and creativity.
Great powers create alliances as formal institutions only to the extent necessary, to ensure their own interests. For example, the ability to deploy forces and assets in the event of a military conflict. But as such deployments become unnecessary, as technical capabilities increase or threats decrease, the value of allies becomes increasingly insufficient
2015 was the year when Russia "discovered" Eurasia. Surprisingly, the continent that was the cradle of many ethnic groups and civilizations and the birthplace of great empires remained, until recently, on the periphery of Russian foreign policy perceptions.
At present, five problem areas can be singled out in the EU. These are crises of: internal political leadership and solidarity; the stability of a single currency and economic growth; normative leadership; immigration and the terrorist threat; and finally, legitimacy. The order of their enumeration is not accidental; the first crisis provokes three subsequent ones (in the economic sphere, ideological rivalry and immigration/terrorist threat), which, in their turn, call into question the EU’s legitimacy. Let’s look at the EU’s present situation through the prism of these five crises, analyzing their essence, causes and development dynamics, as well as the presence of a Russian factor in them (if any). In conclusion, we will consider the implications of these crises for Russia’s relations with Brussels.
Article is devoted to the analysis of EU development in future in the context of those challenges and issues it faces today. The author raises a number of research questions: What will Europe be like when it emerges from an unprecedented migration crisis? Will the EU retain its current shape? Should the EU develop direct relations with the EAEU, a new integration association in Euasia? What benefits can both sides derive from such relations?
Russia is ready for dialogue with the EU on a fundamentally new basis. A return to the relations we had 3 years ago is pointless and impossible. We must create a new format.