In this article the author examines the socio-legal conception of Eugen Ehrlich from the standpoint of its relation to state and to the laws of state. The attention is focused on the practical implications from this conception for functioning of judiciary systems.
In this paper the author examines the key moment of the biography of the Austrian legal thinker, the founder of the Pure Theory of Law, Н. Kelsen. The biographical analysis is conducted in the context of formation of the legal ideas of Kelsen. A special accent is made on characteristic of the law-enforcement process which always implies the concretization of legal provisions and in this sense constitutes a prolongation of the lawmaking process.
In this article the author examines the conceptual problems which the post-soviet jurisprudence meets when dealing with systematization of law, to wit with constructing an order of the legal material and with explaining of unity of law. The author critically reassesses the existing doctrine of divisions inside the law which are led on the base of such criteria as object and method of legal regulation. Subjective nature of these criteria is revealed in this article. From the theoretical standpoint, these criteria turn out to be devoid of sense, as they solely fix conventions of a legal community; one cannot verify significance and veracity of these criteria through a scientific analysis. The author also challenges the conception of systemacity of law which is based on a mixture of value judgments and of facts obtained from description of the positive law. These conceptions of the post-soviet jurisprudence are irretrievably connected with the vulgarized Marxist-Leninist philosophy. As a theoretical alternative to them, one can recur to the conception of «Normative Systems» which were elaborated in the 1970-s by the Argentinean scholars C. E. Alchourron and E. V. Bulygin and which gained a wide acceptance in the Western legal philosophy.
In the present article the author examines the basic theses and methodological postulates of the neorealist theory by a contemporary French legal theoretician and constitutionalist Michel Troper. The author stresses actuality of this theory for better understanding of approaches which are developed in the contemporary legal science to conceive of nature of interpretation of law, of the role a judge plays in interpretation and the limits of her liberty therein. Examination of the neorealist theory is followed by a short analysis of the debates between Michel Troper and another outstanding French legal scholar of our days, Otto Pfersmann.