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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 5
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Article
Welzel C., Deutsch F. British Journal of Political Science. 2012. Vol. 42. No. 2. P. 465-472.
This article examines the impact of values on a key phenomenon of modern politics: non-violent protest. Previous studies have examined only the individual-level effects of values. Studying in addition the 'ecological' effects - how the social prevalence of values affects protest - generates new insights. Focusing on 'emancipative values', two ecological effects are shown: (1) the prevalence of emancipative values lifts people's protest above the level that their own emancipative values suggest (elevator effect); (2) the prevalence of these values enhances the impact of people's own emancipative values on protest (amplifier effect). We conclude that examining values in models of protest (and possibly of other activities), not only as individual attributes but also as ecological properties, gives 'culture' its full weight in explaining behaviour.
Added: Feb 4, 2013
Article
Frye T. M., Reuter O. J., Szakonyi D. S. British Journal of Political Science. 2019. Vol. 49. No. 3. P. 857-881.

From robocalls to vote buying to electoral intimidation scholars have identified many ways that politicians mobilize voters to the polls. We develop a simple argument about the conditions under which autocrats will use positive inducements such as vote buying and negative inducement such as employee coercion of workers.  Using survey experiments and crowd-sourced electoral violation reports from the 2011-12 election cycle in Russia, we find little evidence that vote buying was practiced on a large scale in this election. This finding is consistent with arguments about the decline of vote buying in middle-income countries. Voter intimidation, however, was relatively common, especially among employed voters and in Russia’s many single company towns where employers have much leverage over employees.  In these single company towns, the consequences of job loss are so grave that employer intimidation may often be sufficient to induce compliance even without direct monitoring of voter behavior. Outside of company towns where employers have less leverage, active forms of monitoring may supplement intimidation in order to encourage compliance. These results suggest that employers can be reliable vote brokers; that voter intimidation can persist in a middle-income country; and that, under some conditions intimidation may be employed without the need for active monitoring.

Added: Oct 6, 2017
Article
Szakonyi D. S., Reuter O. J. British Journal of Political Science. 2015. Vol. 45. No. 1. P. 29-51.

What is the effect of online social networking on political awareness? This question has recently gained additional significance for the study of authoritarian regimes, as press accounts draw a link the usage of social networking sites by opposition activists and anti-regime protests in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Russia. We argue that a given online social network will only have an effect on political awareness if it is first politicized by elite activists. We test this argument using original survey data from the 2011 election cycle in Russia. We show that users of Twitter and Facebook, which were politicized by opposition elites, were much more likely to believe that significant electoral fraud had taken place than users of domestic social networking platforms, such as Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, which were not politicized by opposition elites. Our findings highlight the conditional effect of new media on political awareness.

Added: Oct 4, 2013
Article
Welzel C., Inglehart R. F., Kruse S. British Journal of Political Science. 2016. Vol. 47. No. 2. P. 463-472.
Added: Apr 7, 2017
Article
Gimpelson V. E., Treisman D. British Journal of Political Science. 2001. No. 31. P. 225-246.

Political business cycle theories tend to focus on one policy instrument or macroeconomic lever at a time. Efforts to find empirical evidence of opportunistic business cycles have turned up rather meager results. We suggest that these facts may be related. If ways of manipulating the economy to win votes are thought of as substitutes, with changing relative costs, one would expect rational policymakers to switch between them in different periods as costs change. We illustrate this argument with a discussion of Russia. In Russia, four nationwide votes have been held since 1993. We deduce the set of policies that a rational, behind-thescenes strategist—the “Chudar” of the title—would recommend to an incumbent who believes the voters to vote retrospectively. We show that the expectations are born out closely in the actual macroeconomic data.

Added: Jul 14, 2015