The article analyzes the dynamics of mass attitudes towards gender roles based on survey data. In the Soviet time a woman was mobilized twice - as an employee and as a reproductive unit, while full employment in the labor market did not exempt a woman from household chores and childcare. Normative paternity in Soviet times was reduced to a minimum of duties. The reduction of state regulation and control in the late 1980s gave rise to the emergence of new behavioral scenarios, primarily related to the reduction of the area of the forbidden, the removal of sanctimonious taboos. However, in the mid-2000s, the trend changed: The data capture an increase in conservative trends.
The trends of archaization are not specific to Russia, they are present in all societies with varying degrees of severity. Analysis of survey data allows us to identify two poles of attitudes towards family and gender roles. If in the countries of the “old Europe” support for traditionalist views on gender and family roles is consistently reduced, in the countries of the former socialist camp there is a tendency to strengthen them.
The article is devoted to socio-cultural and politico-anthropological analysis of national-populism growth and electoral support of politicians and political parties advocate its ideology in the USA and Europe at present. It is shown that this process constitutes the new wave of “vertical invasion of barbarians” prerequisites of which are conditioned by coming of new civilization reality. It deforms habitual social environment for the “mass man” and makes him feel uncomfortable. Traditional democratic political systems do not respond adequately and timely to these changes. The new wave of “vertical invasion of barbarianism” brought two significant results and both in Anglo-Saxon countries – Brexit in Great Britain and election Donald Trump as president of the United States. In the states of continental Europe it did not bring results of this level. It is assumed this is conditioned that the states of continental Europe which transferred decease of national-populism in severe forms in XX century developed resistance to this phenomenon. However in the states of Anglo-Saxon group required protective mechanisms do not exist.
The article examines issues that define mass choice. The analyses is based on ISSP-2009 results (“Social inequality”, 40 countries, N =55238). Two groups of factors are considered: economic ones and subjective assessments that respondents gave to their social position and situation in the country. Based on the answers the author attempted to predict what structure diagram respondents would choose to describe the society they live in. The literature review shows that expert assessments of incomes inequality do not provide reliable basis for conclusions: less then 5% of predictions were correct in Ukraine, about 13% in Russia. The subjective evaluations provide much more accurate base for prognostication. Using discriminant analysis we predicted correctly about 73% of choices made by respondents. For some countries the proportion of correctly predict answers is even better: 91% for Ukraine, 74% for Russia.
The article discusses the impact of the economic crisis on employment and human capital Russians
Taking as a basis some theoretical considerations of Yury Levada the author examines the meaning of the category and various types and measures of time for sociology. For a sociologist an important characteristic is social forces which determine time and shape the order of its representation in the form of «history». Accordingly L.Gudkov distinguishes the history of various autonomous institutions of society, its groups, social movements; academic history; family history. The paper scrutinizes working out the beliefs about the history of the State («Power») in the USSR at its different stages, their institutionalization at school and in mass media, the influences on collective ideas of contemporary Russians of the their country history, its major events.
This paper aims to reconstruct relationship between consumers and the state. Consumer culture and politics are recognized as overlapping domains. Analysis is based on historical account of sovient consumer culture and data from representative survey in Moscow collected in 2017. We also in historical perspective. Russian state was closely intertwined with consumer affairs. Institutionalization of consumers’ dissatisfaction was an important line of political work during soviet period and postsocialist time. Official consumer complaints reflected the paternal model of dependence of the citizens on the authorities, which was an organic part of the idea of Soviet societal structure. Power asymmetry was formed in soviet consumer culture: lack of competition between state-owned retailers, dependence upon the retailer often left consumers defenseless. Survey results show that consumers still acknowledge the possibility of deceit from market players. Assessment of government’s actions in sphere of consumption is not so different from negative evaluations of stores and producers. Idea that market agents put their interests above consumer interests is a social norm, predictable instability. Muscovites consumer behavior follows what we call “the culture of suspicion”. We can assert that culture of suspicion is a structural constraint, forging consumers’ identity. Accounting for “fairness” of the purchase, consumers expect “righteous” market exchange where each party seeks benevolent and equal relations. By doing so, consumers try to socialize market and to infuse it with moral meaning. Consumers do not separate economic sphere from current social and political reality. Consumers who feeling unprotected and vulnerable before the market system more than others question government efforts to defend their rights. Anticipation of deceit and hazards from market allows to question state’s attempts to restore market justice and to seek the alternative ways of resolving the conflict.
The paper explores symbolic determinants of the political passivity commonly attributed to the majority of Russians. In spite of the high level of the discontent, the majority of Russians does not participate in formal mechanisms of public activity. These discontent citizens do not join political parties or civic organizations and do not even vote for opposition parties. The empirical base of the research is in-depth interviews with a sample of discontents. I define the sample according to attributes identified by the Levada Center in their national research: low levels of social trust, high level of paternalism, and low level of income. I argue that combination of these features generates a particular interpretation of political reality rooted in three discursive limitations of the political participation: the devaluation of the other, which prevents collective actions; an overlapping understanding of state and public, which undermines any types of public activity and a misunderstanding of democracy (democracy is an empty signifier in terms of Laclau).
The paper addresses the issue of the low strata and their relation to the poor in contemporary Russia. To define low strata we employed the Weberian concept of life chances. These chances are realised or deprived in four major domains such as 1) economic conditions of life, 2) situation at work, 3) possibility of preserving and increasing human capital, 4) characteristics of consumption and leisure. Drawing on the RLMS-HSE data (2017) and the IS RAS monitoring data (2015), the paper concludes that low strata represent the low class. Despite this, the low strata and the poor overlap partly. This means that the area of social disadvantages in Russia is much wider than official estimates of poverty.