The article considers the peculiarities of the Russian Orthodox episcopate’s perception of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in the early twentieth century. This issue has recently become the subject of heated discussions, inspired, on the one hand, by the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1917, and, on the other hand, by the orthodox community and some politicians, manipulating the pro-monarchist and ultraconservative rhetoric. There have been used various sources in order to investigate this problem, such as the diary of Metropolitan Arsenius (Stadnitsky), the memoirs of Protopresbyter of the Military and Naval Clergy Georgy Shavelsky, the records of other prominent clerics, and some offi cial documents, including the Holy Synod’s edicts. In addition, some sources used in the research come from the private archive of Archbishop Nikon (Rozhdestvensky), including his letters, diary records, and public appeals. Based on the analysis of the wide range of sources, it is established that at the beginning of the 20th century the Russian senior churchmen did not question the autocrat’s right to secular authority. However, alongside this, in view of the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, the desacralization of the autocracy led to the change of the perception of the autocrat’s right to ecclesiastical authority. Therefore, the discrepancy of views on these rights between the tsar and bishops turned the senior churchmen away from the monarchy in February 1917.
Keywords: autocracy, Nicholas II, senior churchmen, ecclesiastical authority, Russian Orthodox Church
The article is devoted to the Soviet phenomenon of «letters to authorities». Three major interpretations of «letters» are presented: 1) as a way to implement the democratic right for participating in state management and right for justice; 2) as an instrument for repressive political campaign; 3) as a significant form of personal identification with authorities. Claims were an important social phenomenon of the Soviet life. The author presents typical and specific claims (on the materials of Perm State Archives of Contemporary History) and ways of dealing with them on the local level. The author analyses the post-war years’ claims, which help to understand the peculiarities of the Soviet everyday life, the rhetoric of the era, and the forms of citizens’ resistance to injustice.
The author analyses Russian military reforms of the late 19th and early 20thcenturies and their infl uence on the effi ciency of the army and the behavior of the lower ranks in military action. Strategic failures of the national army in the early twentieth century are explained by the fact that even in the modernized armed forces military service was not the same for all groups of citizens. These aspects of the Russian experience are compared to military reforms among the Great War’s other belligerents. The notion of the military as ‘the armed nation’ came in two variants. In Great Britain, the 1916 law on universal conscription and the eff ective mobilization of the civilian population became possible due to the high levels of public support for the political system, the proclaimed values of their country, and a national-civil identity. The German model, by contrast, was built on the foundation not of political integration but of the nation’s identifi cation with its army. Russia chose this model but was unable consistently to implement it, primarily because of the extremely low literacy rate among the lower social classes. The low quality of recruits made it necessary to maintain long periods of service for most of the lower ranks. This resulted in a lack of loyalty on the side of the conscripts, and in a negative attitude not only towards military service but also towards the state that established the heavy standards of military duty. The feeling of social injustice was reinforced by the spartan regime that lower class soldiers encountered, while well-educated conscripts – as a rule, from the upper strata of Russian society – were treated better. This discontent increased during the unsuccessful war, further alienating the mass of the conscripts from autocracy and its army
This article examines the development of trade relations between Russia and Spain during the reign of two Spanish kings: Charles IV and Ferdinand VII. The author’s attention is focused on the agency of diplomats, who made a big advance in the formation of trading relations between the two countries. The author concentrates on Ivan Muravyov-Apostol, the Russian ambassador to Spain (1802-1805), his Spanish partner Gaspar Maria de la Nava y Álvarez de Noroña (1802-1807), and on the consuls of Spain Antoni de Colombí (St. Petersburg) and Francisco de Baguer y Ribas (Odessa). Based on their reports, which are located in both Russian and Spanish archives, it is possible to trace the dependence of commercial relations from the political situation in the world, established in Europe in the era of Napoleonic wars. Their information also allows revealing the main stages of development in trading during these years and the future, observe the merchantry on the Baltic Sea and in the area of the Black Sea. Analyzing these materials, conclusions about the cause of diminishing of the commercial activity between Russia and Spain during the reign of Ferdinand VII can be made. The attention of the author is also paid to the conditions, which were established for the trade of Spain´s main export product to Russia – wine, and trading of grain through the area of the Black and Mediterranean Seas, which received special progress in the beginning of the 19th century.
Article contains the analysis of the latest official textbooks on a national history of Ukraine and Belarus. Textbooks are considered in the light of problems of justification of the national sovereignty, facing historians of the states formed after disintegration of the USSR. The comparative analysis allowed to reveal two types of such justification: anti-Russian and not having confrontational tendencies. Thus, both types showed the efficiency.
The article dwells on the organization and activities of the Soviet advisors group, which assisted to the South China government of Sun Yatsen, its participation in financing Kuomintang political and military projects. The author pointed out that the main aim of the advisors group efforts was to form new Kuomintang power institutions and to bring its policy and army under control, for all that the tactics of implementation of strategy aim were constantly changing.