Brief analysis of some of the most important problems and trends in Russia’s social-political development, including its regional dimension. If the government is smart, it can adjust to objective realities, for example, by reversing the “Center-Regions” pendulum swing toward the regions, and maximizing its benefits. A less smart government would try to resist objective processes and, like a miser, would end up paying twice, if only there is something left in the treasury to pay. If not, another government will come to replace the one currently in power.
To cut losses imposed by Western sanctions, an oligarch-connected company has used its access to the Russian state to gain control of the lucrative crabbing industry. This article lays out the details of the process for the take-over. Going forward, the question is whether Russian business as whole will seek to better defend its interests against this kind of encroachment.
In spite of increasing funding and the establishment of special budget instruments, government policy aimed at the economic development of di erent parts of Russia’s territory has not demonstrated signi cant success. is article suggests that one of the causes for these shortcomings is the in uence of the bureaucracy, which disempowers every new mechanism for resolving current economic problems in the Russian regions, even if doing so has a negative impact on the economic development of the country as a whole. is issue has not been a priority for Russia’s powerful presidency.
This article examines Russian consumers’ evolving attitudes toward imported goods during the post-Soviet era. It also considers the role of market and ideological factors in forming consumer preferences. Ideally, consumers should behave purely rationally, reacting only to the quality of a good, prices, and their own limited budgets. In which country a good is produced should not be important. However, in reality, rather than being guided by market signals, consumer views of goods are determined by political factors and moods, which changed considerably through the course of post-Soviet history.
Established in 2012, the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and Vietnam has yet to live up to its name in terms of both vision and action. Nevertheless, Russian–Vietnamese cooperation is embedded in Russia's emerging Eurasian priorities. Indeed, Russia’s prospective plans for its relations with ASEAN within the context of the Greater Eurasia Partnership strategy could serve to unlock the potential of the partnership between Russia and Vietnam, making it truly comprehensive and strategic.
Persistently among the leading regions of the country since the 1990s, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, like most of Russia’s resource abundant regions, was resilient in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, despite its exposure to international capital flows. In such resource abundant regions, long-run efficient and cooperative budget planning and performance largely account for their dynamic resilience.
The future of Russia depends on whether the elites can agree on new rules of the game. Russia’s highest offi¬cials recognize that in order to preserve the political regime, it is necessary to change the model of relations with business. However, the lack of correct stimuli for bureaucrats at the middle level continues to be a seri¬ous obstacle for development.
An article looks at regulatory reform in Russia. Author outlines that the Russian economy suffers from excessive regulation. He argues that while promising plans to address this problem exist, the government lacks the political will to pursue them and has postponed this reform until the next political opening.
During the last decade, Russian relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have experienced several stress-tests. The active support provided by Moscow to the regime of Bashar al-Assad was expected to turn Russia into one of the main geostrategic opponents of Riyadh. Unexpectedly, in 2015, dialogue between the countries resumed and demonstrated a tendency for normalisation. Among the most important factors in this process was the Saudi recognition of Russia as one of the important players in the region after Moscow’s ‘success’ in Syria.
Since 2012, Russian–Iranian relations have experienced a significant change of course. As opposed to the previous decade of Russian–Iranian relations, both the Russian and Iranian authorities are seriously intended to create a solid foundation for bilateral dialogue. This intention led to the unprecedented intensity of Moscow’s current contacts with Tehran. However, the two countries still need to go beyond mere consultations and finally determine to what extent and in what areas real economic cooperation between them is possible and in what political spheres their collaboration can be effective.
In recent years, relations between Russia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have seen positive trends, but no qualitative shift to a new level of cooperation. Nevertheless, Moscow’s increasing economic and diplomatic reorientation towards Asia, coupled with a confluence between their priorities in regional politics and security, have the potential to make Russia–ASEAN cooperation more versatile and multidimensional.
The December protests in Moscow do not represent a “Russian Spring,” “Orange Revolution,” or new version of Perestroika. Rather they have more in common with the Progressive movement that fought corruption in the U.S. during the early part of the twentieth century. The demonstrations made clear that Russian citizens now want to play an active role in their country’s political life.