The article analyzes the practice of political use of the symbol of the Great Patriotic War by the Russian officials in the 2000-2010s basing on rhetoric of presidents V.Putin and D.Medvedev. It argues that Putin’s attempt to rehabilitate the Soviet past as a part of “the thousand years old Russian state” opened new opportunities for political use of the symbol of the Great Victory than Yeltsin’s formula “the victory of the people, but not of the Communist Party and the Soviet State”. The Victory over the German fascism and USSR’s development into a world superpower became the central elements of the new narrative of the Russian history. As a result of this transformation the symbol of the Victory was “divorced” from the tragic memory of Stalin’s regime. It makes possible its semantic inflation that is revealed by frame analysis of the presidents’ speeches in the Victory Day. But at the same time it hampers an integration of this symbol into a consistent narrative of the national past. Besides, in the context of a radical transformation of European memory regimes it makes the “apologetic” version of the Great Victory vulnerable before challenges from abroad.
The crucial factor which determines inadequate state management in Russia and its low competitiveness in the world is corruption in all fields including politics where it affects the whole «power vertical» from bottom up. A question arises concerning the efficiency of this vertical since in Russia, as in any other state, it is important not all by itself, but as an instrument ensuring the life of the society including quality of life for all citizens.
According to the recent theories of urban management there are the following types of city political regimes: pluralistic, federalist, enterprising, progressive middle class. Growing interest to this approach abroad inspires to use it in relation to nowadays Russia.
The singer, translator and memoirist, Tatyana Ivanovna Leshenko-Sukhomlina's (1903-1998) life strategies of the different periods of her living are reconstructed in this article on the base of her diaries. The author analyzes strategies that allowed her to adapt successfully to the post-revolutionary Russia, despite of the experienced difficulties and repression.
What is the catalyst of democratic rollbacks in the countries of the third wave of democratization [Huntington 1993; Shin 1994; Jaggers & Gurr 1995]? Why do democratic institutions weaken? Which areas of the state’s political life are primarily affected by de-democratization? In this paper, we seek to answer these questions by analyzing a small part of the empirical reality associated with the problem of de-democratization. Hungary and Poland are at the center of this study. These are the countries that were on the crest of the third wave of democratization in the 1990s and early 2000s, but after the right-populist parties came to power (Fidesz in Hungary and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Poland) began to introduce practices that could undermine the work of their democratic institutions. We suggest that Russia is the main exporter of anti-democratic practices to these countries. The domino theory and the theory of linkage and leverage are used to construct the theoretical framework of the study. The explanatory power of these theories is tested when analyzing the de-democratization practices in the considered countries. For the encoding of dependent and independent variables, we refer to the MaxRange Historical World Regime Data database. The main method of data analysis is linear regression analysis. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the main anti-democratic practices that were imported by Hungary and Poland from Russia are the fight against rallies and demonstrations, as well as the fight against unwanted media and NGOs. Russia seems to be the direct supplier of de-democratization for Hungary. At the same time, Budapest plays a role of transit point of de-democratization for Poland.
The instruments used by Russia to achieve integration have changed - today this policy relies more on hard power. At the same time the objectives of Russian policy have not changed, they predominantly geo-economic, not geopolitical.
The article provides an essay on the sistem of territorial self-government in Russia. Activities of zemstvoes and the main results of territorial reform are analyzed. A museum of the Zemstvo is proposed to be created to preserve and stady the experience of the Russian self-government. The consept of such museum is stated.
The Great Reform of 1861 is one of crucial events of Russian history, an example of radical modernization, undoubtedly liberal, endogenous, performed in legal forms and creating a new vision of the world. It can be defined as a real revolution from above, an experience in successful lawful modernization of a traditional society.
The social history of science in the USSR has attracted the attention of a number of researchers. However the Soviet economic science (or Political Economy as it was known then) was used for case studies relatively rare. The present paper describes the case of the Economic Faculty of the Leningrad State University in the late 1940s – early 1950s. The Faculty at that period was at the center of the “Leningrad affair” – one of the last repressive campaigns of the Stalinist era. Despite the extreme circumstances, this case proves some general conclusions made by other researchers on different cases.
The comparison of the Kaluga and Nizhny Novgorod provinces shows that cluster formation represents a technological instrument of federal policy toward regions. To a degree it is a return to the economic branch approach at the new stage of growth. In the framework of cluster development regulation most Russian regions face the task of remaining within a cluster because it guarantees federal support.
The notion of modernization was dominating in Russian political discourse for a short period before 2011-2012. After that the notion came into oblivion, but even amidst the officially proclaimed strive to modernization, in 2008-2011, it was a subject to harsh criticism as a mere rhetorical device.
The claim of the present article is that there were grounds for modernization efforts provided by exhaustion of the post-Soviet recovery economic growth, and by the demand for changes among Russian society. The modernization efforts indeed were of largely rhetorical nature. But it did not indicate the lack of political will among a part of Russian elite, as many critics used to claim. Using the theoretical framework provided by Raúl Prebisch’s concept of peripheral capitalism, the article shows that any attempt to overcome economic backwardness in Russia was and is bound to face major obstacles. The quality of political elite in a peripheral economy is the crucial factor for a successful implementation of development strategy.
Again Russia has politically defined itself as an autocracy oriented toward modernization and camouflaged this time by quasi-democratic rhetoric entourage. For the third time in a century a similar configuration of power is restored. Contours of all autocratic power modifications including the Soviet one are close or even coincide – and this refers also to their actual cultural patterns not ideological fakes whether Orthodox, Communist or ‘democratic’.
Sharp decrease in the social position of high quality labor force is largely a consequence of the social policy which appears a factor of marginalization and an obstacle to the formation of the traditional middle class. Innovating development launched by the Russian leadership is impossible without a sharp increase in expenditures on education and science.