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Regular version of the site
Of all publications in the section: 5
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Article
Goodhart C., Peiris U., Tsomocos D. Journal of Financial Stability. 2018. No. 26. P. 265-278.

Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pursuit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endogenous default and one without, depending on creditors expectations. In the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery rates has the opposite effect.

Added: Nov 28, 2017
Article
Schoors K., Semenova M., Zubanov A. Journal of Financial Stability. 2019. Vol. 43. P. 25-39.

We analyze whether bank familiarity affects depositor behavior during financial crisis. Familiarity is measured by regional or local cues in the bank’s name. Depositor behavior is measured by the depositor’s sensitivity to observable bank risk (depositor discipline). Using 2001–2010 bank-level and region-level data for Russia, we find that depositors of familiar banks become less sensitive to bank risk during a financial crisis relative to depositors of unfamiliar banks. To validate that our results stem from a flight to familiarity during crisis and not from implicit guarantees from regional governments, we split our sample along the lines of regional affinity and trust in local governments. The flight to familiarity effect is strongly confirmed in the subsample of regions with strong regional affinity, while the effect is absent in the subsample of regions with more trust in regional and local governments, lending support to the thesis that our results are driven by a flight to familiarity rather than by implicit guarantees.

Added: May 31, 2019
Article
Schoors K., Semenova M., Zubanov A. Journal of Financial Stability. 2019. Vol. 43. P. 25-39.

We analyze whether bank familiarity affects depositor behavior during financial crisis. Familiarity is measured by regional or local cues in the bank's name. Depositor behavior is measured by the depositor's sensitivity to observable bank risk (depositor discipline). Using 2001-2010 bank-level and region-level data for Russia, we find that depositors of familiar banks become less sensitive to bank risk during a financial crisis relative to depositors of unfamiliar banks. To validate that our results stem from a flight to familiarity during crisis and not from implicit guarantees from regional governments, we split our sample along the lines of regional affinity and trust in local governments. The flight to familiarity effect is strongly confirmed in the subsample of regions with strong regional affinity, while the effect is absent in the subsample of regions with more trust in regional and local governments, lending support to the thesis that our results are driven by a flight to familiarity rather than by implicit guarantees.

Added: Oct 25, 2019
Article
Semenova M., Andrievskaya I. Journal of Financial Stability. 2016. Vol. 23. P. 33-50.

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.

Added: Apr 6, 2016
Article
Mavrotas G., Vinogradov D. Journal of Financial Stability. 2007. Vol. 3. No. 4. P. 295-323.

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.

Added: Jun 26, 2018