Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory of independent and interdependent self-construals had a major influence on social, personality and developmental psychology by highlighting the role of culture in psychological processes. However, research has relied excessively on contrasts between North American and East Asian samples, and commonly-used self-report measures of independence and interdependence frequently fail to show predicted cultural differences. We revisited the conceptualization and measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals in two large-scale multinational surveys, using improved methods for cross-cultural research. We developed (Study 1: N = 2924 students in 16 nations) and validated across cultures (Study 2: N = 7279 adults from 55 cultural groups in 33 nations) a new seven-dimensional model of self-reported ways of being independent or interdependent. Patterns of global variation support some of Markus and Kitayama’s predictions, but a simple contrast between independence and interdependence does not adequately capture the diverse models of selfhood that prevail in different world regions. Cultural groups emphasize different ways of being both independent and interdependent, depending on individualism-collectivism, national socioeconomic development, and religious heritage. Our seven-dimensional model will allow future researchers to test more accurately the implications of cultural models of selfhood for psychological processes in diverse ecocultural contexts
Previous studies have shown that people are good at rapidly estimating ensemble summary statistics, such as the mean size of multiple objects. In the present study, we tested whether these average estimates are based on “raw” retinal representations (proximal sizes) or on how items should appear based on context, such as the viewing distance (distal sizes). In our experiments, observers adjusted the mean size of multiple objects presented at various apparent distances through a stereoscope. In Experiment 1, all items were shifted in depth by the same amount while the adjustable probe stayed at the fixed middle position. We found that presenting ensembles in an apparently remote plane made observers overestimate the mean size, which is consistent with angular sizes being rescaled to distance. In Experiment 2, we presented individual sizes in different planes. While angular sizes and apparent distances were kept controlled across conditions, we only manipulated correlations between them. These manipulations affected the precision of size averaging in line with changes in the range of apparent rather than angular sizes. This pattern is possible only if the visual system rescales each individual size to its distance prior to averaging. Our finding demonstrates that ensemble summaries of basic features, such as size, can be based on quite elaborated representations of multiple objects. We also discuss important implications for size constancy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
We address the question how people’s opinion and features of information interact in the process of indirect social influence. Implicit learning was considered as a mechanism for conformity in social perception. We carried out 2 experiments using a hidden covariation detection paradigm. In a learning phase, participants memorized a set of female photographs presented together with their attractiveness ratings. The ratings correlated with the hairstyle of the photographed women. The participants who did not consciously detect this correlation demonstrated a systematic bias toward the correlation when evaluating the new stimulus persons. Information about the source of the ratings in the learning phase (other people’s opinions or nonsocial sources) did not modulate learning. Learning was not observed when participants critically evaluated the ratings during the memorization phase. The study shows that (a) conformity may be based not only on reinforcement learning mechanism (as was previously suggested) but also on unsupervised implicit learning; (b) implicit learning occurs automatically irrespective of the context (social or not); and (c) a critical attitude toward learned material may prevent implicit learning from being manifested in a test phase. We conclude that indirect social influence may be affected by people’s opinion toward the provided information. The study contributes to both implicit learning and social perception research.
People can store thousands of real-world objects in visual long-term memory with high precision. But are these objects stored as unitary, bound entities, as often assumed, or as bundles of separable features? We tested this in several experiments. In the first series of studies, participants were instructed to remember specific exemplars of real-world objects presented in a particular state (e.g., open/closed, full/empty, etc.), and then were asked to recognize either which exemplars they had seen (e.g., I saw this coffee mug), or which exemplar-state conjunctions they had seen (e.g., I saw this coffee mug and it was full). Participants had a large number of within-category confusions, for example misremembering which states went with which exemplars, while simultaneously showing strong memory for the features themselves (e.g., which states they had seen, which exemplars they had seen). In a second series of studies, we found further evidence of independence: participants were very good at remembering which exemplars they had seen independently of whether these items were presented in a new or old state, but the same did not occur for features known to be truly holistically represented. Thus, we find through 2 lines of evidence that the features of real-world objects that support exemplar discrimination and state discrimination are not bound, suggesting visual objects are not inherently unitary entities in memory.