Analyse of the transformation of traditional and modern models of China’s approach to its status and foreign relation
Every human society in its evolution creates set of institutions. These institutions arises as a result of so to say summarizing of most spread and regular collective habits and societal practices. Have becoming social regulations and norms, some of these institutions transforms themselves into values thus creating a moral infrastructure of any given society. It is possible to suggest that four of these institutions have universal meaning, and thus turn out to become highest values for any society. These are: Justice, Conscience, Family and Motherland. And namely these values have been substantially revised and virtually undermined by policies based in Western societies on assumption of priority of protection minorities’ rights. It’s a special mission of contemporary conservative movements to defend these traditional values as basic institutions of human society as such. And it’s a real chance for Russian conservatives to become a leading force in constituting conservative alternative (integral all-human ideology) to withstand Western self-distructive onslaught on fundamental human institutions/values.
The article examines the prospects of the ongoing transformation of the Chinese foreign policy and possible outcomes of that transformation for Russia. The author argues that that China is at the early stage of building a new Sino-centric system of international relations first in the East Asia and later globally. While partnership with Russia is and will remain essential for the Chinese foreign policy strategy, at some point Russia will have to make a difficult decision about its vision of the future global order.
Classification of Types of Conservatism
Abstract. The origins of democracy date back to the Ancient World, and parliamentarism appeared in the Middle Ages. Their fusion to create representative democracy took nearly two centuries with this evolution process resulting in the appearance of present-day liberal democracy, where the latest form of liberalism have little to do with the laissez faire liberalism of the 19-th century or the Keynesian neo-liberalism of the 20-th. It serves the interests of ﬁ nancial oligarchy and imposes its rules upon the whole world. The former right- and left-wing parties are now merged into the same ruling elite. Nor did the former conservatism stand the test of time, resorting to alliance with neo-conservatism. Various opponents of this elite in the West today are called «populists». The most colorful example of this «populism» of the last decade is the movement of «yellow jackets» in France. Its participants unite socialist and anarchist slogans with the conservative ones and demand the «direct democracy». In Russia we have our own tradition of such unity, beginning with the early Slavophils, and supported by A.I. Solzhenitsyn as «democracy from below».
The article is devoted to the attitude of the social-democratic (in particular, Menshevik) intellectuals to October 1917 events, to the first results and prospects of revolutionary process in Russia. Of course, Russian intelligentsia's point of view has been seriously changed by party "optics" and, above all, by disagreements within Menshevik’s group. The deepening split between «defensists» and «internationalists» not only weakened the positions of the Mensheviks in their struggle with the Bolshevik's regime, but largely determined the political defeat of the Mensheviks at the milestone of 1917-1918. This article shows that in general all Menshevik’s trends were confident in the bourgeois-democratic nature of the Russian revolution and condemned violence as a way of building a new society after the Bolshevik’s rise to power. Meanwhile differences between «international» and «defence» wings significantly deepened. The Menshevik leaders understanding of what is happening in Russia were incompatible with the conception of social humanity and civilized society moral principles. Thence another line of disagreement among the Mensheviks has become relevant to the prospects for the preservation of power by the Bolsheviks and the justification of armed struggle against them.
The article focuses on neoconservatism, its history and evolution as a political and intellectual movement. The article describes the following points: origins of neoconservatism, its transformation in recent years, personalities who represent the movement, reasons of its success. According to the author the rise of neoconservatism is mostly based on its pragmatism and flexibility. The author also points out that neoconservative influence on the US foreign policy is exaggerated, mostly by the media. The Media created «demonic neocons» image. High-level politicians made serious decisions (like Iraq invasion) which followed neoconservative agenda not because of neoconservative influence but because of their own persuasions. The article also describes the differences between neoconservatism and other factions of conservative movement. Author gives brief descriptions of various views on neoconservatism origins. He also offers his own vision, concentrating on three key sources of neoconservative concept – views of Irving Kristol, political philosophy of Leo Strauss and practical implementation of neoconservatism by US Senator Henry M. Jackson. The author proves that initially neoconservatism was not homogenous. For example, Irving Kristol – leading neoconservative – did not find foreign policy interesting and only later started to delve into it. Originally, foreign policy was given to another neoconservative wing – editors and authors of “Commentary” magazine.
Abstract. Russian conservatism makes part of European political thought, as well as Russian party practices in Russia in the XIX century. The article consistently analyzes the stages of development of conservative ideology in Western Europe and in Russia.
The paper is a brief essay on history of libertarianism in the USA with focus on libertarianism as a part of conservative movement. Authors emphasize the fact that many American writers and thinkers of the Right felt strong protolibertarian influence, so libertarianism had all the chances to become the leading current in new American conservatism. In the middle of the 20th century several writers from conservative m “National Review” magazine entertained the idea of “conservative fusionism”, but libertarians rejected it. More, such libertarian leaders as Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard chose confrontation with conservatism. As a result libertarians distanced themselves from conservatism and in the end formed their own party becoming not just an intellectual but also a political movement. Still, Murray Rothbard after his “wilderness years” decided to join the Right again and even offered “paleolibertarian strategy”. But his attempt failed and strategy brought more bad than good to libertarianism, even discrediting the movement. The beginning of 1990s brought the alliance between paleolibertarians and paleoconservatives but no real political successes. Authors point out that in many ways libertarian strain damaged political career of Ron Paul. More, the legacy of paleolibertarian strategy may undermine presidential campaign of Senator Rand Paul – unless he rejects this legacy.
The goal of the present research is to renew the problematisation of Vladimir Lenin’s ideas for modern social and political philosophy thereby actualizing it. Lenin’s ideas ceased to be interesting for Russian human sciences and at the same time became an important issue in the studies of left-oriented western theoreticians. Furthermore Lenin’s ideas became some kind of an assembly point for the classic “western Marxism” that became possible also due to the fact that it actively addressed the ideas and work of Lenin, and even more often addressed just his fi gure. In this respect the present research is more of the historiographic and contextual character and therefore the author doesn’t refer to the texts of Lenin himself. The principal thinker who seriously discusses Lenin’s ideas nowadays is Slovenian social philosopher and cultural theoretician with world reputation Slavoj Žižek. As it is Žižek who’s become one of the main supporters of the necessity to actualize the legacy of the leader of Russian revolution, the author of the present article examines what postulates of Lenin’s political theory Žižek tries to save.
The term “intelligentsia” meaning an educated and “progressive-minded” layer of people was introduced in Russia regardless of the prior popular opinion of P.D. Boborykin. The Russian term is preceded by the German and French analogues: “Intelligenz” and “intellectual” that signified people not belonging to the higher ranks of the “old order”, but differing from the nascent bourgeoisie due to their education, tastes, inclination to criticize the existing regime not corresponding to the criteria if justice and rationality. The researchers of this term evolution note the parallelism of the semantic evolution of “intelligentsia” and “civilization”: concurrent change from adjectives to nouns, definition of the action field of the educated elite. Intelligentsia determined the direction of the culture development. In this regard its function is similar to the function of the ruling power, but in a different notional field. Intellectuals are the ideologists of “par excellence”, they bring meaningfulness to social reality for the uneducated masses.
Article contains comparative analysis of the two most important documents in the epoch of liberal reforms of the reign of Emperor Alexander I – “Memorandum on ancient and modern Russia” by the court historian Nikolai Karamzin and “Four inedited chapters on Russia” be special envoy to Russia of King of Sardinia count Josef de Maistre. Both texts appeared in 1811 and were addressed to the Emperor personally. They presented radical critique of the whole specter of the reforms initiated by Alexander himself and by the time having been carried be his closest aide – State Secretary Mikhail Speransky. Both authors were not plotting against Speransky, but rather had provided Emperor with well elaborated conservative argument aimed at the core of Speranski’s reforms - such as abolition of serfdom, constitutional limitation of absolute monarchy and broad program of enlightenment in the spheres of higher education, sciences and religion. In spite of the fact that both documents had rather limited circulation among the top circle of Russian elite of the time and had been published only half a century later, they could be viewed as truly seminal for the conservative trend in the XIX century Russia.
Famous Russian philosopher Nicolai Berdyaev was always nowadays, and his judgements on his epoch organically combined a take of the publicist and philosophical outlook. But in every cases his critique of contemporary world was founded on basic principles of his existential philosophy. And he always had courage to challenge the evident. Most manifest proof of this point represents his last book “Kingdom of Spirit and Kingdom of Caesar” accomplished within the days before philosopher died on March 24, 1948 in Clamart (vicinity of Paris, France). Berdyaev as a critic of his epoch is unique as far as his conclusions and assessments are based on intuitive insights and shaped rather aphoristically than resulted from discoursive analysis. But this does not diminish their meaningfulness and value. They deserved to be studied in any particular epoch.