This paper develops a methodology for trade policy analysis of costs and benefits of alternative regional integration scenarios. The methodology is based on the disaggregated gravity equation, which is applied to calculate the impact of the EU enlargement on integration strategies of non-member countries. In particular, the paper measures the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement from the standpoint of Ukraine - a country that has been lost in transition. This angle allows estimating the costs of non-integration that occurred due to trade and investment diversion, and forgone opportunity to carry out structural changes in the Ukrainian economy. According to the results, the EU accession would have had a positive effect on total export volumes and would have changed the composition of Ukrainian exports by almost doubling exports of manufactured goods by 2007. The costs of non-integration accumulate towards the end of the investigated period. Projecting the results into the future clearly indicates that the benefits of the EU accession for Ukraine would have been unambiguously positive and would overweight benefits of the CIS integration.
The study uses a Keynesian-type model of the global economy to investigate the impact of the rate of savings, the level of openness and population size on equilibrium tax rates and tax revenues in the world economy with direct and indirect taxation respectively. Within the model, the marginal propensity to consume is represented by a matrix specifying each country’s income distribution between internal consumption, exports and savings. The paper shows that equilibrium tax rates are higher in countries with a higher rate of savings, a greater level of openness and a smaller population size. If there is an infinitely large number of identical and highly-integrated competing countries, then the system with indirect taxation has a lower equilibrium tax rate and a higher tax revenue than the system with direct taxation. If a country with direct taxation and a country with indirect taxation compete, the latter gets a similar advantage.