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К вопросу о персонализме лингвофилософии отца Павла Флоренского: современные рецепции
This paper considers some provisions of Father Pavel Florensky's philosophy of language (and more broadly, the philosophy of the symbol) from the perspective of its reception in contemporary historical-philosophical and linguophilosophical studies. It is shown that the problematization of the question of personalistic/imperpersonalistic nature of Florensky's philosophy can be carried out in several perspectives: critical, apologetic, constructivist. As an example of critical reception we considered the theses of S. S. Khoruzhy, who noted the absence of a developed anthropology in Florensky's symbolist discourse and evaluated his philosophy of the symbol as impersonalistic. It is shown that Khoruzhy's categorical assessment requires correction in the perspective of a more detailed analysis of the intention concept in Florensky's philosophy. The paper also considered the apologetic reception of S. M. Polovinkin, who revealed the personalistic content of Florensky's philosophy (including the philosophy of language) by considering the inherent subject-object unity and asserting the fundamental importance of the volitional aspect ("striving") in the realization of the connection between man and objective reality (symbolic-creation). As an example of creative reconstruction we considered the works of L. A. Gogotishvili, who proposed to consider the status of "ego" in Florensky's linguophilosophy from two points of view: on the one hand, as a condition for expressing transcendental meaning in immanent forms; on the other hand, as a guarantee of communicative intension and attention, connecting the personal "ego" with the word and image. This reconstruction of Florensky's ideas was labeled by Gogotishvili with the term "round" discourse. It is shown that Gogotishvili's reception is novative and developing Florensky's ideas in the linguophilosophical perspective. In conclusion, it was suggested that Gogotishvili's concept of "round" discourse and the possibility of communicative interpretation of Florensky's linguophilosophy lies in his epistemology related to the idea of personalization of cognizable reality.
It is concluded that the absence of a detailed comprehension of the problematics of communicativity and intensionality in Florensky's philosophical discourse, on the one hand, reveals his vulnerability to criticism (accusation of impersonalism), on the other hand, allows for a creative reconstructive reception associated with the actualization of not always obvious potentialities of personalism in Florensky's thought.