The paper discusses the development of metaphysics understood as a philosophical discipline or science. The author would like to propose that the last period of Greek philosophy, that going from about the 3rd to the 6th centuries A.D., made new and interesting contributions to metaphysics as a philosophical discipline, indeed made metaphysics into a metaphysical science, while also bringing out the limits of such a science. The paper has four parts. In part I, D. O’Meara introduces the way in which the great Aristotelian commentator of the early 3rd century, Alexander of Aphrodisias, in interpreting Aristotle's metaphysical treatise, sought to find in it a metaphysical science. In part II of the paper, he attempts to show how the Neoplatonist philosopher of the early 5th century Syrianus, not only adopted Alexander's reading of Aristotle, but was also inspired by it in finding this same metaphysical science already in Plato. In part III of the paper, the author will show how all of this resulted in a masterpiece of metaphysics, the Elements of Theology written by Syrianus' pupil Proclus. Finally, in part IV, he would like to refer to what is perhaps the last great metaphysical work of Greek philosophy, the Treatise on First Principles written by Damascius, a work in which the limits of metaphysical science are explored with extraordinary subtlety and insistence. In adapting Alexander's formalization of Aristotelian metaphysical science to Platonism, Syrianus knew that such a science was a means towards, not the equivalent of, knowledge of the transcendent. Proclus knew it too, even if his Elements of Theology, in presenting metaphysical science with such systematic beauty, could give the impression of being a definitive statement. And, lest we have any illusions about the adequacy of our metaphysical science, Damascius could cure us of these, opening our minds to what lay behind, or above, our own metaphysical efforts.
This paper considers the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) in the light of discussions between himself and Bertrand Russell at the beginning of XX century. Meinong’s conception has made significant contribution into the problem of nonexistent objects that still remains one of the most debated in contemporary philosophy. Here author aims to show how theory of objects as such came into being and how its main ideas were discussed and criticized in subsequent philosophical thought.
The paper describes the necessary metaphysical grounds and central points of J. Searle’s general theory of social reality. It shows how in a world of physical particles and fields of force, the diversity of social life is constructed with the help of one kind of logical and linguistic operations, i.e. declarations of status functions.
This article provides an analysis of philosophical background of two-dimensionalism in general and some its particular variants. The paper demonstrates that two-dimensionalism should be treated not as artificial addition to conventional possible worlds semantics but as its natural generalization. It is also shown how ontological and epistemological problems (the correlation between primary and secondary intensions, apriority and necessity, the nature of «mixed» truths etc.) could be converted into pragmatic ones.
The Collection is devoted some problems in interpretations of Russian philosophy and literature in the world Thinker.
There is a chronological study in this paper consisting of three parts: 1) the conception of simplicity of God maintained by St. Thomas Aquinas, 2) rejection of God’s simplicity undertaken by Alvin Plantinga, and 3) an attempt to return to the idea of the simplicity of God in modern analytic research.
The present paper deals with the problem of omnipotence in the context of an original version of possible worlds ontology developed by Alvin Plantinga. His conception of “de re” and “de dicto” is analyzed in connection with the problems of essentialism and transworld identification. Using the notion of TWD (“transworld depravity”) Plantinga claim to solve the logical problem of evil, this solution being the part of his famous FWD (“free will defense”) program. Plantinga’s strategy is to confine the notion of omnipotence step by step with rational arguments. But some of his technical concepts are not clear-cut enough and some of his philosophical speculations are rather scholastic.