Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Buyers
The paper characterizes the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism for allocating a good to buyers who face asymmetric budget constraints. The optimal mechanism belongs to one of two classes. When the budget differences between the buyers are small, the mechanism discriminates only between high-valuation types for whom the budget constraint is binding. All low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences. When budget differences are sufficiently large, the mechanism discriminates in favor of buyers with small budgets when the valuations are low, and in favor of buyers with larger budgets when the valuations are high. We also provide a characterization of the constrained-efficient (surplus maximizing) mechanism and demonstrate that it shares the above properties of the optimal mechanism.
I argue that Friedrich von Hayek anticipated some major results in the theory of mechanism design. © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
I consider the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are absent and an outside option may exist. I study the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually incompatible: (1) ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness, and (3) ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound. Result 1 is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex-post efficiency ; results 2 and 3 are more practical than similar results in the literature. In addition, for N=3, I give two characterizations of the celebrated random serial dictatorship mechanism: it is the unique strategy-proof, ex-post efficient mechanism that (4) provides agents that have the same ordinal preferences with assignments not dominated by each other (weak envy-freeness among equals), or (5) provides agents that have the same cardinal preferences with assignments of equal expected utility (symmetry). These results strengthen the characterization by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001); result 5 implies the impossibility result by Zhou (1990).
This paper discusses the scientific and practical perspectives of using general game playing in business-to-business price negotiations as a part of Procurement 4.0 revolution. The status quo of digital price negotiations software, which emerged from intuitive solutions to business goals and refereed to as electronic auctions in industry, is summarized in a scientific context. Description of such aspects as auctioneers’ interventions, asymmetry among players and time- depended features reveals the nature of nowadays electronic auctions to be rather termed as price games. This paper strongly suggests general game playing as the crucial technology for automation of human rule setting in those games. Game theory, genetic programming, experimental economics, and AI human player simulation are also discussed as satellite topics. SIDL-type game descriptions languages and their formal game-theoretic foundations are presented.
Analysis of problems of utilization of oil associated gas is given. Method for optimal distribution of expenses to laying of gas pi peline, taking into account a financing from oil companies and possible participation of government, is proposed. A multi-criteria model for selection of optimal alternative of utilization of oil associated gas is given. Software is made implementing the developed algorithms.