Do bystanders react to bribery?
Do individuals consider bribery as an acceptable behavior? We use a newly-designed game to study if—and under which conditions—bystanders are willing to express disapproval for bribing behavior through costly punishment. We manipulate two key dimensions: the benefits accrued by corrupt actors and the externality imposed on idle victims. We show that on average bystanders were unresponsive nearly half of the time they witnessed bribery. We also find that context specificity matters, as bystanders were more willing to punish when bribing caused them a disadvantageous inequity with respect to corrupt actors, even if bribing enhanced overall welfare. In an additional experiment testing whether social norms play any role in punishment decisions, we find that norms did not align with the observed bystanders’ behavior. This further supports our main result that bystanders did not react to bribery due to a concern for the social norm, but rather for their own comparative disadvantage relative to corrupt actors.
In article the picture of changes of standard-values system of the Russian society is presented. It is shown that, remaining as a whole neoetatcratic, it in last years has undergone the essential changes testifying to its slow washing out traditionalist kernel.
While many past theoretical discussions on nature of social norms were centered on a problem of their precise definition, I propose an analysis of peculiar character of sociological theorizing about norms which is grounded in a wider interdisciplinary context (particularly, on sociologically relevant implications from H.L.A. Hart’s and H. Kelsen’s views on law and norms) and based on systematization of principal norm-related questions which varying types of theories attempt to answer, i.e., nature of norms, social mechanisms of their maintenance and change, analytic and empirically-based distinctions between norms and rules and conventions, irreducible complexity of norms, etc. Besides, the chapter presents a systematic review of classical and modern approaches to elucidation of intricate relations between multiple normative systems, e.g., law and morality. I also discuss some recent arguments against moral relativism in social sciences brought forward by S. Lukes.
The collective monograph presents the results of the theoretical and historical-sociological research of the normative grammar of social action as well as the moral infrastructure of social order. The research was based on the in-depth analysis of the relevant mainstream and also rather peripheral ideas and concepts of classical and modern social theory, cognitive science and the ‘new’ sociology of morality. Among the main topics of the monograph are the theoretical re-interpretation of the concept of “norm” in an interdisciplinary perspective, the mechanisms of normative morphogenesis, structures of group and professional morals, and theoretical examination of risk-responsibility link in everyday moral evaluations. In addition, historical-theoretical reconstruction of some classical sociological theories is used for outlining new prospects in theoretical interpretation of the processes of normative change and crystallization and also of the multiplicity of normative systems. The book will be useful to readers in many different fields of social sciences and humanities, including those studying sociology at advanced level. It also will make an immediate appeal to the general reader familiar with contemporary social theory.
The author analize implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 1977 in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Special attention paid to the influence of the Convention on the development of anti-corruption compliance control in companies, to the liability for corruption offenses and application of the UK and the US anti-corruption law to foreign companies.