On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase and a one‐off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves rules. These rules should encourage truthful bidding, whereas the clock phase is intended to reveal information. We inquire into the role of the clock when bidders have lexicographic preferences for raising rivals' costs. We show that in an efficient equilibrium, the clock cannot fully reveal bidders' types. In the spirit of the ratchet effect, in the supplementary round competitors extract surplus from strong bidders whose type is revealed. We also show that if there is substantial room for information revelation, that is, if the uncertainty about the final allocation is large, all equilibria of the CCA are inefficient. Qualitative features of our equilibria are in line with evidence concerning bidding behavior in some recent CCAs.
We study whether SAAs and CCAs generate prices that reflect bidders’ opportunity costs.•
When bidders have preferences to raise rivals’ cost, CCAs may fail to generate market-oriented prices.•
Even when a CCA ends with excess supply, it may fail to generate market-oriented prices.
The objective many telecom regulators want to achieve when they decide to auction spectrum is that acquiring firms pay a market price (based on the opportunity cost principle). The simultaneous ascending auction may fail in this respect, as it provides bidders with an opportunity to engage in strategic demand reduction. This paper asks whether the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) fares better in this respect. We show that the answer to this question depends on the objectives bidders have. If bidders have only the slightest preference to raise rivals' cost, they will use the opportunities the CCA provides them to engage in strategic demand expansion. This is even the case when the clock phase ends with excess demand. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.
The paper discusses a multi-paradigm approach to the modeling of Demand Responsive Transport systems. It contains a brief overview of issues which appear during modeling of such systems, considers various multi-agent architectures and describes some algorithms which can be used for modeling. Also the paper provides some details about previous investigations on this topic, in particular: a centralized model based on combinatorial auctions and a multi-agent based multi-layer distributed hybrid model. The aim of the paper is working out a sound solution based on a combination of these two approaches which would utilize “system of systems” engineering approach where layered architecture would help to deal with real-time issues and increase system’s reliability and combinatorial auctions would help with global search of the optimal solution. Such combination improves the efficiency and reliability of the system.
Challenges of urbanization require new, more flexible approaches to design of public transportation systems. Demand Responsive Transport systems (DRT) that provide a share transportation services with flexible routes and focus on optimizing of economic and environmental value are becoming an important part of public transportation. In this paper we propose a new approach to design of DRT models which considers DRT as a multi-agent system (MAS) where various autonomous agents represent interests of system’s stakeholders. The distributed nature of the MAS facilitates design of scalable implementations in modern cloud environments. We also propose a planning algorithm based on combinatorial auctions (CA) that allows to express commodity of multiple transportation scenarios by evident means of the bids. Using the mechanism of CA we may fully take into account the presence of complementariness and substitutability among the items that differ across bidders. Further, we describe design principles of our proposed software with a prototype implementation. We believe that our approach to multi-agent modeling is general enough to provide the flexibility necessary for adoption of DRT-services modeling into real-world scenarios. The results of modeling have been compared against several cases of a local bus provider and validated in a set of computational experiments.
Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be winning bids, assisting bidders to engage in spiteful bidding.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.