Article
Industry equilibrium and welfare in monopolistic competition under uncertainty
This paper offers a new theory that describes the influence of uncertainty on economic fundamentals. This theory posits that uncertainty can improve social welfare. We argue that in an economy, where spending of the customers for the differentiated good correlates with larger substitutability of its varieties, the equilibrium output decreases and the prices increase when uncertainty appears. Alternatively, if such spending and substitutability anti-correlate, the predictions for the price and output changes are reversed. The arguments are based on general equilibrium
modeling with the monopolistic competition of firms which produce varieties of the differentiated good under limited information regarding the consumer demand. The impact of uncertainty on the equilibrium is assessed by using the relationship between the weighted elasticity of substitution between varieties, the elasticity of the consumer utility, and the income share spent on the differentiated good.
Some countries treat public-private partnerships (PPP) within public procurement legislation, whilst others adopt a specially designed PPP law to distinguish PPPs from the routine purchases of goods and services. There is no evidence to suggest which of the approaches is more efficient. Differences are visible even for highly developed economies such as the UK (no special PPP law, rather policy guidance) and the US (special PPP laws adopted in over 30 States, counting.) Does it make sense to have a special PPP legislation? If yes, what should such legislation govern? The last question seems tautological as “a PPP legislation should govern public-private partnerships”, yet we claim that in order to promote economic efficiency, the law should focus on the environment that surrounds public-private relationships. We develop a model of PPP based on the system of standard contractual agreements between the government and the private sector, like the typical contracts used in public procurement. Due to the asymmetric information, some socially desirable projects are too costly to run within a standard procurement contract, this is where partnerships should help. Specific features that are needed to make those costly projects feasible, include a reduction in the information costs through a closer monitoring within the co-production, a reduction in the production costs through a lesser red tape, and extra benefits (distinct from subsidies and monetary rewards) to the private partner, arising from the cooperation with the state (e.g. reputational gains, access to new resources, etc.) In an institutional/cultural environment with [most of] these features in force, a special PPP legislation is not needed (UK and Australia are prominent examples), as there is no scope for a further reduction of the number of infeasible (costly) projects. Otherwise, a PPP law that offers the above features (e.g. by creating a dedicated PPP advisory unit) is socially desirable.
Research focus on the discursive conceptualization of migration in contemporary European politics.
Many industries are made of a few big firms, which are able to manipulate the market outcome, and of a host of small businesses, each of which has a negligible impact on the market. We provide a general equilibrium framework that encapsulates both market structures. Due to the higher toughness of competition, the entry of big firms leads them to sell more through a market expansion effect generated by the shrinking of the monopolistically competitive fringe. Furthermore, social welfare increases with the number of big firms because the pro-competitive effect associated with entry dominates the resulting decrease in product diversity.
This chapter addresses the relationship between class, family and social welfare policies by analysing the construction of the identity category of ‘unfortunate families’ (neblagopoluchnye sem’i) in popular scientific discourses, governmental policy documents and discourses of social services, and by examining how those labelled as ‘unfortunate’ negotiate this identity conferred to them. The chapter shows that gender and class are closely intertwined in the production of this identity, as it is single mothers who are primarily categorised as ‘unfortunate’. In our analysis we draw on multiple sources of data. First, we analyse in-depth and focus group interviews with service providers and clients and participant observation data from a number of Russian cities. Second, we analyse various government documents and social advertisements, mass media materials, social policy and social work textbooks, and popular scientific texts published during the 1990–2010s. This chapter begins with a review of Western theoretical discussions of class in the context of family and welfare in order to see how Russia fits into these debates. Western class analysis was considered irrelevant in the Soviet Union due to the supposedly classless nature of advanced socialism, but the transition to a market economy in the 1990s and the new kind of class society it engendered have made these discussions topical in Russia. In the second section of this chapter we offer a brief description of the main principles of the Soviet and post-Soviet welfare ideologies and the policies towards families. The following sections examine how popular scientific discourses, governmental policy documents and social advertisements, and social service providers construct class with the concept of the unfortunate family. The last section preceding the conclusions analyses how mothers labelled as unfortunate negotiate this stigmatised identity.
We propose a model of monopolistic competition with additive preferences and variable marginal costs. Using the concept of "relative love for variety," we provide a full characterization of the free-entry equilibrium. When the relative love for variety increases with individual consumption, the market generates pro-competitive effects. When it decreases, the market mimics anti-competitive behavior. The constant elasticity of substitution is the only case in which all competitive effects are washed out. We also show that our results hold true when the economy involves several sectors, firms are heterogeneous, and preferences are given by the quadratic utility and the translog.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.