Влияние корпоративного управления на дивидендные выплаты на разных стадиях жизненного цикла корпорации
The modern model of the corporation involves the separation of property and control, which
often leads to the emergence of corporate conflicts, which are a serious obstacle to the effec
tive distribution of capital. The study of the relationship of dividend policy and the quality of
corporate governance is an important task. On the one hand, decisions on payout policy and
capital structure can be viewed as mechanisms for resolving agency conflicts or substitutes for
best corporate governance practices. On the other hand, the quality of corporate governance
itself is a determining factor in financial decisions. This paper attempts to explain previously
obtained contradictory empirical results using the theory of the corporate life cycle. The dir
rection of the relationship between dividend payments and quality of corporate governance at
different stages in the life cycle may vary. For the ISS index, the outcome theory better explains
the payout policy in later stages of the life cycle for mature, stable companies that have signifi
cant resources to resolve agency conflicts. The model of substitutes, in turn, explains the use
of the payout policy at the early stages of the life cycle, when the cost of building high-quality
corporate governance far exceeds potential losses from dividend payments.
The article examines the issue of differences in the dividend policy of public and private companies in Russia. State corporations form more than 40% of revenues of the largest Russian companies, at the same time the role of ownership structure in determining dividend policy is not uniquely determined in the literature. Comparative analysis of Russian companies shows that nonlinear dependence is possible. We use panel data from nonfinancial companies listed in Moscow stock exchange from 2008 to 2016, who paid dividends during this period, 150 companies in total. Three specifications are considered: the one with dividend payout ratio as a dependent variable, the one with a share of dividends in free cash flow, and the one with nonlinear dependence of dividend payout ratio and share of state participation. Control variables are based on the life-cycle theory. Linear form does not show statistically significant relationship between the dividend payments and the shares of state participation. We find that the relationship is nonlinear and has the upside down U shape. For a low level of state participation, the relationship is positive, for a high level it is negative. This result is in line with the agency theory: a positive link indicates the use of dividends to resolve an agency conflict; a negative link implies concentration of money in the hands of managers in the absence of the power of minority shareholders. The future research is associated with adding institutional constraints to the analysis and using the framework of sustainable development of the firm.
This study explores the value creation and agent conflict in a company that employs intangibles. The conceptual model of value creation is used to test how intangibles affect companies' outperforming and simultaneously build investors' expectations. The research is carried out using a sample of more than 1,650 European companies covering the period from 2004 to 2011. The study reveals the diverse impact of intangibles on the outperforming of a company by Economic Value Added (EVA) and its ability to create market value (MVA). The study discovers that managers are prone to set positive signals for investors rather than create sustainable competitive advantages. This work contributes primarily to the field of corporate governance in companies that employ intangibles. The issues to be considered when designing rules and incentives for proper communication between managers and investors that drive both outperforming and sustainable value creation are emphasized.
This paper contributes to understanding the relationship between insider ownership and investment performance in emerging markets measured by marginal Tobin’s Q. We will attempt to separate the positive wealth effect of managerial ownership from the negative entrenchment effect. The research analyses other determinants of corporate investment performance: institutional ownership, firm size and R&D intensity. The study was conducted on the sample of companies of Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa over 4-year period, 2009-2012.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.