Политика господдержки предприятий в период кризиса 2008-2009 гг.: критерии отнесения к «системообразующим»
The article deals with the issue of the potential of the russian diplomacy after ukrainian crisis. The author analyzes the current position of Russia on the international arena, the prospects for cooperatipon with key partners, with the United States primarily taking into acount the end of Cold War. The paper proposes an effective model of Russian foreign policy in the form of recommendations for the progresive development of the Eurasian project, capacity builduing of soft power as well as the transiton of the effectiveness and the totality of Russia's diplomacy.
Authors argue how Russia has politically reacted to the crisis. As compared to other Central and Eastern European transition economies, Russia experienced an extremely steep decline of its GDP (about 8% in 2009) during the global financial crisis but managed to maintain and even increase living standards. However, unlike CEE countries, in 2013, Russia already faced a new economic slowdown and entered recession in 2014–2016 after the acceleration of geopolitical tensions with the West within the context of the Ukrainian crisis. In this chapter the authors will show the reasons for the economic slowdown in 2013, including key features of the Russian model of economic development in the 2000s, its crash during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and the failed attempts to change the model in 2009–2011. Their analysis is based on the limited access order (LAO) framework formulated by North et al. (2009; 2013). They try to explain the instability of Russian economic growth as the unpreparedness of dominant groups within the ruling elite to restrain their own ambitions and take into account the interests of other players. They also analyze the role of key elite groups (the oligarchs, federal bureaucracy, and siloviki) during every stage of development as well as the role of new elite groups that have also evolved within that system, including the regional bureaucracy, successful medium-sized businesses, and public sector elites. Taking into account political constraints, the authors argue the key drivers and main risks of economic development in Russia. Finally, they discuss conditions for transition to a new model of economic development.
It is now widely accepted that modern economic science failed to foresee the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. However it is appear that there is still a lack of understanding fundamental causes of this crush and its aftermath. The available standard forecasting models and theories for the growth of the global economy are barely able to make correct forecasts in a crisis period and treat this crisis as a cyclical one. Moreover the nature of this crisis and its long-run effect on the global economy cannot be grasped within Keynesianism and neoliberalism, which prevail in economics and policy makers` discourses. The authors argue that today`s crisis is not a regular cyclical one. It is of systemic nature and in fact has been provoked by a surplus of financial rather than productive capital. The current conditions of the global economy development deeply impacted by the crisis of 2008-2009 have the character of restructuring the entire economic system and economic relations. Actually, this crisis has to form a new the 21st century global economy and to destroy the old economic, financial and technological relations. It is very likely that period from 2014 to 2016 will be marked by a new phase of the global economy transformation towards the building of new types of financial and economic relations, as well next wave of crisis phenomena will occur.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.