Social Norms in Networks
Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on
peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this study, we develop
a social-norm model that provides a microfoundation of the linear-in-means model
and investigate its properties. We show that individual outcomes may increase,
decrease, or vary non-monotonically with the taste for conformity. Equilibria are
usually ineffcient and, to restore the rst best, the planner needs to subsidize (tax)
agents whose neighbors make efforts above (below) the social norms. Thus, giving
more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily effcient. We also discuss the
policy implications of our model in terms of education and crime.
In article the picture of changes of standard-values system of the Russian society is presented. It is shown that, remaining as a whole neoetatcratic, it in last years has undergone the essential changes testifying to its slow washing out traditionalist kernel.
We consider a game equilibrium in a network in each node of which an economy is described by the simple two-period model of endogenous growth with production and knowledge externalities. Each node of the network obtains an externality produced by the sum of knowledge in neighbor nodes. Uniqueness of the inner equilibrium is proved. Three ways of behavior of each agent are distinguished: active, passive, hyperactive. Behavior of agents in dependence on received externalities is studied. It is shown that the equilibrium depends on the network structure. We study the role of passive agents; in particular, possibilities of connection of components of active agents through components of passive agents. A notion of type of node is introduced and classification of networks based on this notion is provided. It is shown that the inner equilibrium depends not on the size of network but on its structure in terms of the types of nodes, and in similar networks of different size agents of the same type behave in similar way.
In this paper, we analyse the results of a project of Network of Excellence (NoEs), a new virtual form of research community integration. We outline international experiences of informal and formal research communities and the development stages of the Russian project. We conclude the paper with the project development prospects.
The collective monograph presents the results of the theoretical and historical-sociological research of the normative grammar of social action as well as the moral infrastructure of social order. The research was based on the in-depth analysis of the relevant mainstream and also rather peripheral ideas and concepts of classical and modern social theory, cognitive science and the ‘new’ sociology of morality. Among the main topics of the monograph are the theoretical re-interpretation of the concept of “norm” in an interdisciplinary perspective, the mechanisms of normative morphogenesis, structures of group and professional morals, and theoretical examination of risk-responsibility link in everyday moral evaluations. In addition, historical-theoretical reconstruction of some classical sociological theories is used for outlining new prospects in theoretical interpretation of the processes of normative change and crystallization and also of the multiplicity of normative systems. The book will be useful to readers in many different fields of social sciences and humanities, including those studying sociology at advanced level. It also will make an immediate appeal to the general reader familiar with contemporary social theory.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.