How Our Relationship With Technology is Destroying the Planet
This article argues that our desire to manipulate and control nature through our use of technology is the cause of our current climate crisis. It then explores alternative ways of using technology and relating to the natural world.
In What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger provocatively says that: “science does not think” (WCT 8). Unfortunately, Heidegger does very little to explain this bold claim, or explicitly articulate what he sees as the unthinking aspects of science. With that said, this essay elucidates Heidegger’s controversial assertion by aligning Heidegger’s distinction between Gestelland Gelassenheitwith Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Briefly, the idea is that the puzzle-solving of normal science, much like the calculative activity that orders modern technology (Gestell), fails to ask what it means for scientific entities to be. However, theparadigm-testing of revolutionary science represents a releasement (Gelassenheit) from the practices and presuppositions of normal science such that it is able to ask about the beingof scientific entities. In short, revolutionary science thinks about the being of entities in a way that normal science does not.
In order to make the connection between Heidegger and Kuhn clear and thereby explain Heidegger’s claim that “science does not think,” I begin this essay with an account of the distinction Heidegger makes between being and entities. I then spell out this distinction and tentatively explicate the meaning of being via an analysis of Kuhn’s distinction between scientific paradigms and the objects we study through them. The basic thought is that Heidegger’s “being” is akin to Kuhn’s “paradigms” insofar as both tell us what it means for a specific entity or object to be. In Section 2, I explain why science does not think about the being of entities. Specifically, I connect Heidegger’s interpretation of scientific explanation and calculation with Kuhn’s account of puzzle-solving in normal science. I then illustrate why the pursuit of problems related to entities precludes questioning the paradigm that presents us with those entities and also leads to the dangers Heidegger sees in modern technology. In Section 3, I compare Heidegger’s interpretation of our releasement from the calculative activities that characterize technology with Kuhn’s account of the paradigm shifts that typify revolutionary science. In doing so, I note that revolutionary science does think about the being of entities, but in Section 4 I indicate a key difference between Heidegger and Kuhn over the extent to which thinking is either externalor internalto the practices of science. As Heidegger sees it, thinking about the being of entities is achieved through a releasementfrom calculative activities. But for Kuhn it is an intense engagementwith the puzzle-solving of normal science that enables a paradigm shift. This suggests Heidegger might be skeptical about science’s ability to think even in the revolutionary case, whereas Kuhn appears to be optimistic about science’s ability to think, generally. Finally, I show that Heidegger may still have some sympathy for Kuhn’s position insofar as Kuhn’s account of anomalies is consistent with Heidegger’s claim that as the dangers of technology grow the potential for being saved grows as well.
This article identifies and discusses two basic prerequisites for the fruitful interpretation and reception of Heidegger’s art philosophy. The First is the reconstruction and analysis of the role, which the problematic of art played in the theoretical genesis of so-called “turn” (die „Kehre“, in German) in Heidegger’s philosophical pathway that took place in the 1930s. The second prerequisite is a successful integration of Heidegger’s ideas to the nature of art into the contemporary discussions around the notion of the aesthetic, its changing boundaries and functions. The article focuses on epistemological, spatial, and material aspects of Heidegger’s conception of art, which are especially of interest in the context of contemporary aesthetic theory, whose sphere of competence ranges from the region of art to the variety of aesthetic experiences in everyday life.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
Innovation-Based Development of the Mineral Resources Sector: Challenges and Prospects contains the contributions presented at the XI Russian-German Raw Materials Conference (Potsdam, Germany, 7-8 November 2018). The Russian-German Raw Materials Conference is held within the framework of the “Permanent Russian-German Forum on the Issues of the Use of Raw Materials”, which has as goals to develop new approaches to effectively use energy, mineral and renewable natural resources and to initiate cooperation in the field of sustainability and environmental protection. The contributions cover current trends in the development of raw materials markets and the world economy, the state of the environment and new technologies applied in the sector, effectively responding to modern challenges. The 63 accepted papers are grouped into four main sections:
• Mineral exploration and mining
• Mining services
• Processing of raw materials
Innovation-Based Development of the Mineral Resources Sector: Challenges and Prospects will be of interest to academics and researchers involved in the mineral resources sector, but also to professionals in the public, foreign trade and education fields, and representatives of major corporations and professional associations.
This collection offers the first comprehensive and definitive account of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It does so through a detailed analysis of canonical texts and recently published primary sources on two crucial concepts in Heidegger’s later thought: Gelassenheit and Gestell. Gelassenheit, translated as ‘releasement’, and Gestell, often translated as ‘enframing’, stand as opposing ideas in Heidegger’s work whereby the meditative thinking of Gelassenheit counters the dangers of our technological framing of the world in Gestell. After opening with a scholarly overview of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology as a whole, this volume focuses on important Heideggerian critiques of science, technology, and modern industrialized society as well as Heidegger’s belief that transformations in our thought processes enable us to resist the restrictive domain of modern techno-scientific practice. Key themes discussed in this collection include: the history, development, and defining features of modern technology; the relationship between scientific theories and their technological instantiations; the nature of human agency and the essence of education in the age of technology; and the ethical, political, and environmental impact of our current techno-scientific customs. This volume also addresses the connection between Heidegger’s critique of technology and his involvement with the Nazis. Finally, and with contributions from a number of renowned Heidegger scholars, the original essays in this collection will be of great interest to students of Philosophy, Technology Studies, the History of Science, Critical Theory, Environmental Studies, Education, Sociology, and Political Theory.
This article argues that the origin of the work of art is not some kind of “happening of truth” (Heidegger); rather, it is what the Greeks call “improvisation”—that is, not simply free play, but far more self-schematization.
In his “Sein und Zeit”, and in corresponding lection courses as well, Heidegger transforms the methodological gesture of Husserl. Now the method doesn’t determine the object, alternatively, the object of phenomenology, as the way of the meetingness of ontological structures, determines the phenomenological method – as the method of their “reading-out” or “clearing-out”. The legitimized area of the philosophical work turns to be not the phenomenon, seen in the mirror of reflection, which is always late, but the way this method is exposed to Dasein, the way it corresponds to it. “How” turns to new “what”, the paradigm phenomena turn to be the affective states of Dasein (anxiety, concern), and not the perception of the extended thing.
This work shows that being must originally be understood as implication. We begin with what Heidegger calls Hegel’s ‘new concept of being’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit: time as history is the essence of being. This concept however, is not univocal—for supersession means destroying-preserving. Hegel shows himself to be the thinker of truth as essentially ambiguous; and the Phenomenology is onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, the history of the being and unity, time and aspect, of the concept’s ambiguity. For Heidegger however, conceptual ambiguity confirms that Hegel’s history of being is stuck in a vulgar interpretation of time; and the Phenomenology can explain neither the origin of this time, nor the necessity of negation for the historical determination of being—for Hegel cannot think the ground of the concept of being, that is, the grounding of the ground. If Heidegger argues however, that the Phenomenology is predetermined by its ancient point of departure, we must go back to the Greeks, back to Aristotle’s original insight (overlooked by the entire history of philosophy as metaphysics): being and unity imply one another—for they are essentially implications. Thus the question of the meaning of being becomes the question of the meaning of implication.