Воздействие на доверие населения как способ преодоления ловушки ликвидности
In the aftermath of 2007—2009 global financial crisis, many economies had stuck in a liquidity trap. This stance forced central banks to implement various unconventional monetary policies, including massive purchases of financial assets, cutting policy rates down into the negative zone and reliance on forward guidance. In this paper we critically discuss these policy measures. Unconventional policy success in overcoming a liquidity trap heavily depends on the ability to manage private agents’ expectations. If the central bank is capable to form expectations of low interest rates for a prolonged period after the escape from a liquidity trap, unconventional monetary policies lead to a recovery. Another crucial issue is dynamic inconsistency of prolonged low interest rate policy. We discuss several ways of how the central bank can commit not to lift policy rate up to keep inflation unnecessary low.
This paper examines the impact of the main regular communication channel of the Bank of Russia – press releases after the Bank of Russia Board of Directors meetings on monetary policy issues – on the Moscow Prime Offered Rate (MosPrime Rate). We show that the press releases of the Bank of Russia can have a significant impact on the MosPrime Rate and its volatility.
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 has changed the landscape for monetary policy. Many central banks in developed economies had to employ various unconventional policy tools to overcome a liquidity trap. These included large-scale asset purchase programs, forward guidance and negative interest rate policies. While recently, some central banks were able to return to conventional monetary policy, for many countries the effectiveness of unconventional policies remains an issue. In this paper we assess diverse practices of unconventional monetary policy with a particular focus on expectations and time consistency. The principal aspect of successful policy in terms of overcoming a liquidity trap is the confidence that interest rates will remain low for a prolonged period. However, forming such expectations faces the problem of time inconsistency of optimal policy. We discuss some directions to solve this problem.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the Central Bank, the key institutions of the financial sector. This paper deals with the major changes the functioning of this institution in modern conditions, reveals mechanism of the unconventional monetary policy in the liquidity trap.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.