Notes on Heidegger and Time
The question of what is time, is asked by Augustine: “I know what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I want to explain it to an enquirer, I do not know.” Aristotle, however, explains: time is not the cause of generation and corruption, coming to presence and going out into absence, becoming as a whole. Rather, bodies decay, change happens, things move (more or less), physis becomes—and time counts the ways.2 Or, as Elizabeth Barrett Browning put it poetically: “How do I love thee? Let me count the ways”—that is time, not the loving, but the counting of how so.
This paper examines the conceptual transformations of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of death in Vladimir Bibikhin’s philosophy. For this purpose, the author analyzes Bibikhin’s phenomenology of death in the context of the ontology of time worked out in Bibikhin’s lectures “(It’s) Time.” The key difference between Bibikhin’s ontology and the one from “Being and Time” is the approximation of the past and the future in “(It’s) Time” based on Bibikhin’s interpretation of these tenses as the restrictions of human activity. The limit of this activity is death, in which, according to Bibikhin, “I will not be able to do anything.” Moreover, Bibikhin pulls together death and childhood memories as well as Heideggerian concepts of understanding and mood. This trends are most noticeable in the “Early Heidegger” workshop, in which Bibikhin uses certain excerpts from Heidegger’s works to ground the concept of death as impossibility of action. The comparison of Bibikhin and Kojève’s phenomenology of death shows that Bibikhin eliminates the reference to non-being from the concept of death. Nevertheless, Bibikhin’s thought continues some patterns of Heidegger and Kojève’s atheistic phenomenology. For instance, Bibikhin reduces the transcendence to the existential modes, in which it can be given. Therefore, Bibikhin in several cases describes the death not in philosophical, but in religious terms.
In What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger provocatively says that: “science does not think” (WCT 8). Unfortunately, Heidegger does very little to explain this bold claim, or explicitly articulate what he sees as the unthinking aspects of science. With that said, this essay elucidates Heidegger’s controversial assertion by aligning Heidegger’s distinction between Gestelland Gelassenheitwith Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Briefly, the idea is that the puzzle-solving of normal science, much like the calculative activity that orders modern technology (Gestell), fails to ask what it means for scientific entities to be. However, theparadigm-testing of revolutionary science represents a releasement (Gelassenheit) from the practices and presuppositions of normal science such that it is able to ask about the beingof scientific entities. In short, revolutionary science thinks about the being of entities in a way that normal science does not.
In order to make the connection between Heidegger and Kuhn clear and thereby explain Heidegger’s claim that “science does not think,” I begin this essay with an account of the distinction Heidegger makes between being and entities. I then spell out this distinction and tentatively explicate the meaning of being via an analysis of Kuhn’s distinction between scientific paradigms and the objects we study through them. The basic thought is that Heidegger’s “being” is akin to Kuhn’s “paradigms” insofar as both tell us what it means for a specific entity or object to be. In Section 2, I explain why science does not think about the being of entities. Specifically, I connect Heidegger’s interpretation of scientific explanation and calculation with Kuhn’s account of puzzle-solving in normal science. I then illustrate why the pursuit of problems related to entities precludes questioning the paradigm that presents us with those entities and also leads to the dangers Heidegger sees in modern technology. In Section 3, I compare Heidegger’s interpretation of our releasement from the calculative activities that characterize technology with Kuhn’s account of the paradigm shifts that typify revolutionary science. In doing so, I note that revolutionary science does think about the being of entities, but in Section 4 I indicate a key difference between Heidegger and Kuhn over the extent to which thinking is either externalor internalto the practices of science. As Heidegger sees it, thinking about the being of entities is achieved through a releasementfrom calculative activities. But for Kuhn it is an intense engagementwith the puzzle-solving of normal science that enables a paradigm shift. This suggests Heidegger might be skeptical about science’s ability to think even in the revolutionary case, whereas Kuhn appears to be optimistic about science’s ability to think, generally. Finally, I show that Heidegger may still have some sympathy for Kuhn’s position insofar as Kuhn’s account of anomalies is consistent with Heidegger’s claim that as the dangers of technology grow the potential for being saved grows as well.
The paper offers a critical analysis of a programmatic article by Alexander Mikhailovsky devoted to the reception of the “late” Heidegger’s philosophy in Russian philosophical community. I mainly focus on Mikhailovsky’s thesis on the peculiar esoterism of Heidegger’s “being-historical” thought demanding a special philosophical practice of a “meaningful silence” considered as the only commensurate approach to it. Moreover, according to Mikhailovsky, only Russian cultural and philosophical space (by which he understands mainly the Russia’s conservative cultural and political thought) retains the ability to perform this kind of silence, while Western researchers and scholars have completely lost it.
I put forward the following main arguments against the A. Mikhailovsky’s theses: 1) at once several varieties of “esoterism” are inherent in Heidegger’s philosophy (both “early” and “late”), none of which requires a disavowal of public scientific discussion and, instead, an undertaking of a particular socio-political mission; 2) Heidegger’s conception of the so-called “other beginning” is not a radical-reformist but diagnostic one, that is to say, in its basic intentions it is not active revolutionary but rather quietist; 3) By now, the most substantial contribution to the systematic research of Heidegger’s legacy is made by Western interpreters; 4) Heidegger’s publishing policy testifies precisely to his intention to prevent ideologized forms of appropriation of his philosophy and, on the contrary, to guarantee the possibility of its systematic scientific reception.
In addition to issues of content, I pay attention to the rhetorical form of the article in question. From my point of view, Alexander Mikhailovsky’s rhetorical strategy draws on a general tonality that came to be strongly associated with reception of Heidegger in Russian speaking cultural space due to the translations of Heidegger’s works into Russian in the 1980-90s. In conclusion I present in general outline my own – alternative – view on the productive strategies of treating the Heidegger’s theoretical legacy.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
This essay examines Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis in light of the account of Western history that he introduces inBeing and Time, develops in his work from the 1930s, and finalizes in his lectures on technology in the 1940s. Specifically, I start with a summary of Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time, i.e., to ‘raise anew the question of the meaning of being’ via a ‘deconstruction of the history of ontology.’ I then demonstrate that Heidegger’s early enthusiasm for National Socialism was partially based on his belief that the Nazis represented a break from the Western tradition that begins with Greek metaphysics and culminates in the human dislocation found in our modern, technologically driven societies. From here, I show that Heidegger realized that National Socialism actually represented the apotheosis of modern technology. I also explain how Heidegger’s critique of technology develops out of his disillusionment with the Nazis, and so amounts to an implicit critique of National Socialism. Finally, I object to Heidegger’s account of the Western tradition by showing that his focus on the general trends of history overlooks the concrete suffering of individual human beings. But then I illustrate how this criticism is addressed by one of Heidegger’s students: Emmanuel Levinas.
This collection offers the first comprehensive and definitive account of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It does so through a detailed analysis of canonical texts and recently published primary sources on two crucial concepts in Heidegger’s later thought: Gelassenheit and Gestell. Gelassenheit, translated as ‘releasement’, and Gestell, often translated as ‘enframing’, stand as opposing ideas in Heidegger’s work whereby the meditative thinking of Gelassenheit counters the dangers of our technological framing of the world in Gestell. After opening with a scholarly overview of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology as a whole, this volume focuses on important Heideggerian critiques of science, technology, and modern industrialized society as well as Heidegger’s belief that transformations in our thought processes enable us to resist the restrictive domain of modern techno-scientific practice. Key themes discussed in this collection include: the history, development, and defining features of modern technology; the relationship between scientific theories and their technological instantiations; the nature of human agency and the essence of education in the age of technology; and the ethical, political, and environmental impact of our current techno-scientific customs. This volume also addresses the connection between Heidegger’s critique of technology and his involvement with the Nazis. Finally, and with contributions from a number of renowned Heidegger scholars, the original essays in this collection will be of great interest to students of Philosophy, Technology Studies, the History of Science, Critical Theory, Environmental Studies, Education, Sociology, and Political Theory.
We live in a world where technology reaches into every aspect of our lives. Technological devices are with us from the minute we wake up until the moment we fall asleep. We trade digital information with a host of individuals at a rate that was inconceivable just a generation ago. Contemporary health researchers and technology experts have begun to identify the symptoms of technology fatigue: a form of anxiety that results from always being available and from the need to constantly engage with our technology. Yet despite the impact technology has on our daily life, relatively little philosophical reflection has gone into explaining what draws us into technology’s embrace.
Beginning in the mid-1930s, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) turned his attention to the framework in which technological devices are understood. Heidegger was one of the most important thinkers of the 20thcentury and his philosophy of technology is based on the relation between two key concepts: Gestell and Gelassenheit. Gestellis often translated as “enframing” or “positionality” and it indicates the way we frame, position, and ultimately reduce the world to resources for production and consumption. Specifically,Gestell refers to our tendency to make everything, including ourselves, a resource ready to be called on in the service of a technological system. According to Heidegger, reducing the world to readily available resources is dangerous because it undermines our creative engagement with reality, alienates us from ourselves and each other, and leads to the destruction of our habitat. The antidote to this condition is: Gelassenheit. Gelassenheitis translated as “releasement” or “equanimity” and it refers to a disposition that blocks us from imposing our will on things and thus opens us up to alternative ways of relating to reality. In short, Gestell and Gelassenheit stand as opposing ideas in Heidegger’s analysis of technology whereby the releasement characteristic of Gelassenheit counters the dangers of our technological framing of the world via Gestell.
Although there are several important books that address Gestelland Gelassenheit when discussing other themes in Heidegger’s work, this volume offers the first comprehensive and definitive account of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. It does so by collecting essays from leading Heidegger scholars on key aspects of Heidegger’s thought on techno-science. Some of the central themes addressed in this collection include: the history, development, and defining features of modern technology; the relationship between scientific theories and their technological instantiations; the nature of human agency and the essence of education in the age of technology; and the ethical, political, and environmental impact of our current techno-scientific customs. Of course, presenting a complete account of a book’s content is beyond the scope of any introduction. However, in Section 1 we explain our scholarly aims and practical ambitions in putting together this volume. In Section 2, we describe the development of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology from his early phenomenological work to his later essays on the essence of technology. In Section 3, we offer a slightly more detailed account of Gestell and Gelassenheit. Finally, in Section 4 we provide a short summary of the seventeen essays collected here.
Martin Heidegger is arguably the most influential philosopher of the 20th Century. He was also a card-carrying member of the Nazi Party. Debate over the relation between Heidegger’s thought and his political engagement has raged since Heidegger officially joined the Nazis in 1933. However, the recent publication of Heidegger’s private notebooks offers scholars new and detailed insight into Heidegger’s intellectual development and political commitments in the interwar period. In this essay, I examine Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis in light of the philosophical account of Western history (Seinsgeschichte) that Heidegger introduces in his 1927 edition of Being and Time, develops in his notebooks and other writings from the 1930s, and finalizes in his lectures on technology in the 1940s. Specifically, I start with a summary of Heidegger’s stated aim in Being and Time, namely, to “raise anew the question of the meaning of being” through a “phenomenological deconstruction of the history of ontology” (BT1/19, 39/63).I then demonstrate that Heidegger’s early enthusiasm for National Socialism was partially based on his belief that the Nazis represented a radical break from the Western tradition that begins with Greek metaphysics and culminates in the environmental degradation and human dislocation in our modern, technologically driven societies. From here, I show that Heidegger came to realize that, far from a break with Western history, National Socialism represented the apotheosis of modern technology. At this point, I also explain how Heidegger’s later critique of technology develops out of his disillusionment with the Nazis, and so amounts to an implicit and occasionally explicit critique of National Socialism. Finally, I object to Heidegger’s philosophical account of the Western tradition by pointing out that his focus on the general trends of history overlooks the concrete suffering of individual human beings, but then I illustrate how this criticism is addressed by one of Heidegger’s most influential students: Emmanuel Levinas.