Agency Problem and Ownership Structure: Outside Blockholder As a Signal
We propose a model in which an entrepreneur, seeking outside fi nancing, sells a large equity share to an outside blockholder in order to signal his low propensity to extract private benefi ts. A conventional theoretical rationale for the presence of an outside block holder is mitigation of the agency problem via some type of monitoring or intervention. Our model provides a novel insight: outside blockholders may be attracted by fi rms with low, rather than high, agency problems. Our result yields a new implication for the interpretation of an often documented positive relationship between outside ownership concentration in a fi rm and its market valuation: such relationship may be driven by “sorting” rather than by a direct effect of blockholder monitoring. In fact, we show that the positive correlation may arise even if the blockholder derives private benefi ts and has no positive impact on the value of small shares. Finally, we argue that our analysis may help explain why the market reacts more favorably to private placements of equity as opposed to public issues.
The need for transmission and storage of large amounts of scientific data in the project space radio telescope ”Radioastron” required us to organize a reliable communication channel between the tracking station in Pushchino and treatment centers in Moscow. Network management data requires us to an integrated approach and covers the organization secure access to manage network devices, timely replacement of equipment and software upgrades, backups, as well as documentation of the network infrastructure. The reliability of the channel is highly dependent on continuous monitoring of network and server equipment and communication lines.
Repeated bidding games were introduced by De Meyer and Saley (2002) to analyze the evolution of the price system at finance markets with asymmetric information. In the paper of De Meyer and Saley arbitrary bids are allowed. It is more realistic to assume that players may assign only discrete bids proportional to a minimal currency unit. This paper represents a survey of author's results on discrete bidding games with asymmetric information.
The report discusses methods and software tools for the creation of information-analytical system (IAS) monitoring of dangerous celestial bodies and planning Asteroid-comet hazard (ACH). The article provides a description of the structure of the system and its functional components to enable rapid assessment of potential threats and forecast the effects of a collision dangerous space objects to the Earth. The result of the system is the integrated analytical information about the possible risks for the decision to reduce the possible damage and to identify effective measures for emergency management of cosmic origin.
We describe optimal contest success functions (CSF) which maximize expected revenues of an administrator who allocates under informational asymmetry a source of rent among competing bidders. It is shown that in the case of independent private values rent administrator’s optimal mechanism can always be implemented via some CSFs as posited by Tullock. Optimal endogenous CSFs have properties which are often assumed a priori as plausible features of rent-seeking contests; the paper therefore validates such assumptions for a broad class of contests. Various extensions or optimal CSFs are analyzed.
Over the last decade aural and visual monitoring of massive people gatherings has become a critical problem of national security. Whenever possible a fixed infrastructure is used for this purpose. However, in case of spontaneous gatherings the infrastructure may not be available. In this paper, we propose the system for spontaneous “flash crowd” monitoring in areas with no fixed infrastructure. The basic concept is to engage users with their mobile devices to participate in the monitoring process. The system takes on characteristics of “big data” generators. We analyze the proposed system for coverage metrics and estimate the rate imposed on the wireless network. Our results show that given a certain level of participation the LTE network can support aural monitoring with prescribed guarantees. However, the modern LTE system cannot fully support visual monitoring as much more capacity is required. This capacity may potentially be provided by forthcoming millimeter wave and terahertz communications systems.
We consider multistage bidding models where two types of risky assets (shares) are traded between two agents that have different information on the liquidation prices of traded assets. These prices are random integer variables that are determined by the initial chance move according to a probability distribution p over the two-dimensional integer lattice that is known to both players. Player 1 is informed on the prices of both types of shares, but Player 2 is not. The bids may take any integer value.
The model of n-stage bidding is reduced to a zero-sum repeated game with lack of information on one side. We show that, if liquidation prices of shares have finite variances, then the sequence of values of n-step games is bounded. This makes it reasonable to consider the bidding of unlimited duration that is reduced to the infinite game G1(p). We offer the solutions for these games.
We begin with constructing solutions for these games with distributions p having two and three-point supports. Next, we build the optimal strategies of Player 1 for bidding games G1(p) with arbitrary distributions p as convex combinations of his optimal strategies for such games with distributions having two- and three-point supports. To do this we construct the symmetric representation of probability distributions with fixed integer expectation vectors as a convex combination of distributions with not more than three-point supports and with the same expectation vectors.