Рынок семян: глобализация, конкуренция и интеллектуальная собственность
The paper explores the competition dynamics of the global
seed market. It documents the economic concentration
of the sector, in particular the M&A activity of the major
seed companies and their reliance on complex intellectual
property strategies in order to offer a one stop shop
solution to farmers. Recent merger activity in this sector
(the Monsanto bid to buy Syngenta, the DuPont and Dow
merger deal, ChemChina’s bid to buy Syngenta) illustrates
its rapid transformation from an already concentrated
industry to a tight oligopoly on a global scale. The increasing
global consolidation of this industry raises new
challenges for competition law enforcement authorities
dealing with the emergence of new powerful actors at the
factor of production (input) level, in view of the broader
concerns animating public policy in the food sector and
the existence of a nexus of international commitments for
biodiversity, sustainability, the right to food etc. By exploring
this under-studied but fascinating area of competition law
enforcement we open the debate over the inclusion of
broader public interest concerns in competition policy and
the consideration of its distributive impact from a global
Dr. Frédéric Jenny is the Renaissance man of competition policy. As an economist, scholar, judge and enforcer, he has helped transform the landscape of global competition enforcement. In the first volume of this Liber Amicorum, distinguished members of both Bar and Bench, as well as academics from around the world, come together to bear testimony to his international achievements. This collection of 21 articles celebrates Dr. Jenny’s career thus far, and also explores other timely and topical areas of competition law and policy.
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of antitrust system was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. The analysis takes into account such institutional problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason”), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
The article shows how the integration within the EU predetermined the development of antitrust policy in CEE countries, including the trend of the use of "rule of reason" approach. Simultaneously in the article was analyzed the experience of CEE countries in the variability of government intervention mechanisms.
In the third part of the article were shown main trends in antitrust policy transformation in CEE and common problems, that still remain actual for transition economies in this area, including the interaction problem of administrative and criminal law, rigidity of prohibitions problem and the effectiveness of leniency program design.
Contemporary state of the competitive intransitivity hypothesis is considered. Intransitive competition among species occurs when, for example, species A outcompetes species B, B outcompetes C, and C outcompetes A (sometimes written as A > B > C > A). In the first part of the article, a summary of the studies of competitive intransitivity is given. Examples of really existing intransitive loops are discussed, as well as simulation models that provide a theoretical explanation for these processes. Pro hac vice, sufficient potential diversity of community, species interactions carried out in relatively stable limited space that can be reclaimed, and a penalty for the acquisition of competitive ability are prerequisite. In the second part, the hypothesis of competitive intransitivity is compared with neutral theory and niche theory. The results are believed to make some generalizations possible which could stimulate deeper understanding of the species coexistence phenomenon.
The underinvestment in the specific assets due to the «hold up» is one of the key issues in the theory of the firm. Till the very end of the twentieth century discussing the «hold up» problem researchers considered only the so-called «selfish» relation-specific investments. But later their attention was switched to the analysis of another specific investments type, named «cooperative» or «cross» investments, which is much more risky than the selfish investments. Besides that, the riskiness of such investments depends on their specifity degree – the specific investments can be partly specific or full specific. In its turn, the degree of specifity determined by the partners’ ability to benefit from selfish or cooperative specific investments in contacts with “alternative” contractors. If such gains equal zero, that specific investments (cooperative or selfish) are full specific to the “main” partner. Respectively, if the gains from partnership with “alternative” contractors are more than zero, that such specific investments are partly specific to the “main” partner.
Unfortunately the present regulatory documents, determining the application the rule of reason, don’t take into account the character of specific investments. The negative consequences of such approach are illustrated in the first part of the article, where the court’s decision in case of Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS (PFDC) v. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi is analyzed. The second part of the article is dedicated to the discussion of possible solutions of this problem.
Based on the analysis of actual problems of legal statistics suggestions for improving its use in the study of crime and measures of the struggles she and demonstrates ways to increase trust legal statistics and teaching effectiveness as discipline in law schools.
The article is devoted to a particular form of freedom of assembly — the right to counter-demonstrate. The author underlines the value of this right as an element of democratic society, but also acknowledges the risk of violent actions among participants of opposing demonstrations. Due to this risk, the government may adopt adequate measures restricting the right to counter-demonstrate, certain types of which are analyzed in this paper.
Development of standards of international controllability is reviewed in the article. Institutional approach is applied to development of international legal regime of Energy Charter. Definition of controllability is connected to development of international standards of dispute settlement, which are described in the article in detail. In connection with controllability, Russian interest, defense of investment in European Union and ecological investment encouragement, is reviewed in the article.
мировое управление и управляемость, Мировая экономика, международное экономическое право, энергетическая хартия, International control and controllability, International economics, international economic law, Energy Charter
международное частное право; недвижимость; ; школа бартолистов; бартолисты; теория статутов; статуарная теория/