Целостность коррумпированных государств: взяточничество как неформальный институт управления
The author analize implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 1977 in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Special attention paid to the influence of the Convention on the development of anti-corruption compliance control in companies, to the liability for corruption offenses and application of the UK and the US anti-corruption law to foreign companies.
We address the external effects on public sector efficiency measures acquired using Data Envelopment Analysis. We use the health care system in Russian regions in 2011 to evaluate modern approaches to accounting for external effects. We propose a promising method of correcting DEA efficiency measures. Despite the multiple advantages DEA offers, the usage of this approach carries with it a number of methodological difficulties. Accounting for multiple factors of efficiency calls for more complex methods, among which the most promising are DMU clustering and calculating local production possibility frontiers. Using regression models for estimate correction requires further study due to possible systematic errors during estimation. A mixture of data correction and DMU clustering together with multi-stage DEA seems most promising at the moment. Analyzing several stages of transforming society’s resources into social welfare will allow for picking out the weak points in a state agency’s work.
It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.
The book contains a huge number of articles deducated to the present problems of state, regional. municipal governance. The analysis of international and domestic practice of governance discussed.
Purpose: communication in queues with priorities as a factor of changes in bids. Discussion: in models of waiting lines imperfect information is common, but redistributing available information betweeen agents if often ignored. Meanwhile in real life people or firms can reveal hidden characteristics of their neighbors by communicating to them. Results: estimation the value of bribe taking into account expected bribes of other agents is considered. Communication that enables to get to know relevant information is suggested. We show cases in which it reduces the amount of bribes.
Institutional balance in Europe, issues of governance
These Proceedings represent the work of contributors to the 14th European Conference on Management Leadership and Governance, ECMLG 2018, hosted this year by the HU University of Applied Sciences, Utrecht, Netherlands on 18 - 19 October 2018. ECMLG is a well established platform for individuals to present their research findings, display their work in progress and discuss conceptual advances in many different branches of Management, Leadership and Governance. At the same time it provides an important opportunity for members of the community to come together with peers, share knowledge and exchange ideas. The conference is generally attended by participants from more than 35 countries and attracts an interesting combination of academic scholars, practitioners and individuals who are engaged in various aspects of management, leadership and governance
Based on a survey of a representative sample of nonprofit organizations, this article explores the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) on the nonprofit sector. The study addresses two questions: What is the level of SOX adoption by nonprofit organizations? and How do we explain variations in the adoption level of SOX? Using Poisson regression models, our study finds that the level of SOX adoption in nonprofit organizations is determined to a large extent by nonprofit organizations’ accountability and transparency structure prior to SOX. When this factor is taken into account, contrary to previous studies, the level of SOX adoption by nonprofits is modest. In addition to the existing accountability structure, important variables in the statistical explanation of SOX adoption include CEOs’ familiarity with SOX, attitudes of nonprofit CEOs toward SOX, and organization size.