Корпоративная социальная ответственность как эффективный сигнал безопасности продуктов питания: результаты экономико-математического моделирования
This paper discusses the question of whether the strategy of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an effective signal of the high-level of food safety. Although the state mechanisms to reduce the problem of adverse selection acting, a large number of falsified and counterfeit food indicates its presence in the Russian food market. Specificity of food (its experimental and trusting qualities) makes it impossible for consumers to measure its quality characteristics before purchasing the product.
The analysis is based on the Bertrand model with differentiated product. As a result of game-theoretic modeling, conditions of formation of the "desirable" Nash equilibrium are obtained in which CSR policy is carried out only by the firms that produce safer products. The comparison of possible Nash equilibria leads to the conclusion that the effectiveness of CSR strategy as a safety signal is determined by the control and level of support of the state, and by the proportion of "responsible" consumers who care about their health. We can have a "desirable" Nash equilibrium in the absence of "responsible" consumers, but only if the state controls and provides a high level of support to businesses that produce safer products. This means that among the factors responsible for the low activity of producers in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR) there is the weakness or absence of mechanisms to support producers from the state as well as a small proportion of consumers who are concerned about their health, their weak activity in the assessment of the safety level when choosing foods.