Нерыночное размещение долга как финансовая репрессия
Under fiscal stress the government often turns to practice of financial repression to lower the debt service cost. Captive pension fund is one of the targets for enlarging the demand for public debt. We propose an extension of the overlapping generations model with the fully-funded pension system and fiscal policy to question the optimality of financial repression in the form of non-market placement of the public debt. Despite its negative impact on the capital accumulation, financial repression is used to finance public goods and can be an element of optimal tax policy of the benevolent government.
In the article there are analyzes the direction of reforming of institutional regulation of pension transfers in the developed world and in Ukraine. On the basis of the institutional approach argumented the importance of the transition to a funded pension system as adequate market conditions. Analyzed institutional factors limiting its introduction in Ukraine.
Financial repression in the form of regulated expansion of demand for public bonds with below-market rate of return stabilizes public debt and decreases its service cost. This helps financing of fiscal stimuli programs in times of economic recession and high public sector indebtedness. But being implicit and distortionary taxation of households, financial repression interferes with market mechanisms and can decrease the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. In this paper we augment the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the elements of financial repression to evaluate the impact of financial repression on fiscal multipliers. We compare different regimes of finance of fiscal expansion and confirm that lump-sum taxation delivers the highest multiplier, while proportional labor income taxation leads to substantial distortions and decreases the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. Most importantly, we show that tighter financial repression in the form of higher requirement for households to hold public debt only marginally decreases the fiscal multiplier. At the same time, tightening repression by decreasing the rate of return on public bonds leads to higher fiscal multiplier. This result is in line with the literature, which shows higher effectiveness of fiscal stimuli under zero lower bound in the money market. We also estimate the short- and the long-run impact of financial repression on public debt. Under substantial inflation inertia, positive monetary policy shock provides long lasting effect of the liquidation of public debt.
We consider standard monopolistic competition models in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz or Melitz with aggregate consumer's preferences defined by two well- known classes of utility functions – the implicitly defined Kimball utility function and the variable elasticity of substitution utility function. These two classes gene- ralize classical constant elasticity of substitution utility function and overcome its lack of flexibility. It is shown in [Dhingra, Morrow, 2012] that for the monopolis- tic competition model with aggregate consumer’s preferences defined by the va- riable elasticity of substitution utility function the laissez-faire equilibrium is effi- cient (i.e. coincides with social welfare state) only for the special case of constant elasticity of substitution utility function. We prove that the constant elasticity of substitution utility function is also the only one which leads to efficient laissez- faire equilibrium in the monopolistic competition model with aggregate consu- mer’s preferences defined by the utility function from the Kimball class. Our main result is following: we find that in both cases a special tax on firms' output may be introduced such that market equilibrium becomes socially efficient. In both cases this tax is calculated up to an arbitrary constant, and some considerations about the «most reasonable» value of this constant are presented.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.