Локализация хозяйственных рисков, порожденных международными санкциями
This article discusses the objectives and challenges for corporate governance of SOEs in Russia, and provides an international perspective of the performance of SOEs as compared to privately owned companies. Recent trends in the policy and management of state property are described. The problems of corporate governance in Russia are described in an agency perspective, and survey evidence on corporate governance and transparency of Russian SOEs is provided. Particular attention is given to the legal construction of the state corporation. The final section on the performance effects of state ownership summarizes the key contributions in the international economic literature in this field.
In accordance with the international investment legislation, a state is entitled to implement expropriation and nationalization measures with respect to foreign investments within its territory on condition of guaranteed prompt, efficient and adequate compensation provision in favor of investors. The article notes that there is no clear description of the phenomenon of foreign investors' property alienation in the Russian or world practice. Consideration is given to the types of expropriation: direct, aimed at deprivation of property rights for investments by authorities; indirect, or "creeping" expropriation representing gradual divestiture; and measures that are equivalent to expropriation and inhibit receipts of investment benefits. It is underscored that in the process of investment evaluation it is necessary to take into consideration the degree of intervention in property rights, intentions of the government, and the impossibility to discharge adequate investors' expectations.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.